In search of the generative question : a hermeneutic approach to pedagogy by Graaff, Johann
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 










IN SEARCH OF THE GENERATIVE QUESTION: A HERMENEUTIC APPROACH TO 
PEDAGOGY 
Johann Graaff 
A dissertation submitted to the Humanities Faculty at the University of Cape Town in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Higher Education 
Studies 











I declare that this dissertation is my own, unaided work. It is submitted in partial 
fulfillment for the degree of Master of Higher Education Studies at the University of 














This dissertation investigates, first, the kinds of transformation that have occurred in the 
perceptions and identities of a first year sociology class at the University of Cape Town (UCT), 
and, second, the learning experiences that have led to, or been associated with, those changes. 
It does that through Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics. On the first issue, Gadamer proposes 
that the social sciences brings individuals to a meeting with the alien, and that this meeting 
effects a transformation of the self. This means both (following Jardine) to 'return life to its original 
difficulty', and (following Kerdeman) to be 'pulled up short'. But meeting the alien is not the same 
as meeting the Other. And for Stuart Hall meeting the Other is not the same as for Frantz Fanon. 
These notions need to be quite carefully distinguished. 
The transformations which students experience go through some of these variations, such 
meeting the alien, and experiencing the Other (as conceptualized by both Hall and Fanon). None 
actually meet the Other in the sense of re-integrating a projection. These changes are in addition 
impossible to predict, and this delivers an important critique of Outcomes-Based Education. 
On the second issue, the expenences which effect these changes, it is the process of questioning 
or of challenging. Gadamer's writing discusses four different kinds of questions or challenges. 
The first forms part of our ongoing, everyday living. It is the ontological challenge which the 
unexpected poses to our existing stock of resources. The second is the challenge which 
hermeneutics poses to accepted public opinion or the doxa. This overlaps very considerably with 
the processes proposed by writers like Peter Berger and Anthony Giddens of debunking (delving 
behind the glossy images which people and institutions present of themselves, also known as 
ideology critique in critical theory), relativizing (making the unfamiliar familiar. and vice versa) and 
system-relating (linking the detail of individual lives with societal structures aka. theorizing) which 
the SOCiological imagination pursues. The third form of questioning derives from the Socratic 
dialectical method. In its generative (rather than destructive) form Socrates' questions aimed to 
produce a state of perplexity in his interlocutors by showing the logical untenability of their 
opinions and the need for clear definitions. The fourth form of questioning occurs in the research 
process with the interrogation of material world through the methods of ethnography and focus 
groups. Generative forms of questioning build on Carl Rogers' unconditional positive regard. 
1 I am immensely grateful for the contributions by the members of the Centre for Higher 
Education Development (CHED) in discussions around this material, and particularly to Lucia 










While there are suggestive hints at the origins of the transformations in student experiences, it is 
very difficult to pin down explicit links. But the aim of hermeneutics is not the identification of 
causes. It is much rather the heightening of sensitivity, the elaboration of the detail and the 
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Among the greatest insights that Plato's account of Socrates affords us is that, contrary 
to general opinion, it is more difficult to ask questions than to answer them . .. To 
someone who engages in dialogue only to prove himself right and not to gain insight, 
asking questions will indeed seem easier than answering them. .. In order to be able to 
ask, one must want to know, and that means knowing that one does not know. 
(Gadamer, 1989:363) 
" ... the logic of the human sciences is a logic of the question. "(Gadamer, 1989:370) 
Chapter 1 : The Story of a Project: the contextual frame 
This dissertation arises out of a context of teaching first year sociology at the University of Cape 
Town, a concatenation of events, which for our purposes starts in July of 2003. Umberto Eco 
writes in The Name of the Rose that texts are palimpsests. He means to say that all texts are 
written on top of, through, embedded in, other texts. One dimension of understanding is an 
apprehension of some of this multi-layered circumstance. (Circum - stance:: finding yourself 
standing surrounded by pre-formed structures.) It is, of course, impossible to be complete in this 
work of context. All de-layering of the complexity of situations is partial. All research is 
fragmentary. It comforts itself that it's stitching together of pieces amounts to something more 
than just bricolage. What follows are some of the prior texts into, and on to, which this one was 
written. 
The Sociology first year course, SOC105S, Individual and Society, had, in the second half of 
2003, a troubled trajectory. During the first 6 weeks of the course (from mid-July to end August) 
there were recurring student complaints about the course. They centred around the lecturing style 
of a particular female lecturer (whom I shall call Carmen). One group of five students came to see 
me, as course convenor, to tell me their problems. Another student let me know that she intended 
to write a letter to the campus newspaper, Varsity, but first copied the letter to the Head of 
Department, the Students Representative Council, and to the Dean of the Faculty. She was 
outraged that debate in class had been stifled. Another student stood up in the middle of a 
lecture, shouted her frustration at the lecturer, "We don't have a clue what you are talking 
about!!", and then stormed out. Another group of students went to see the Head of Department. In 
effect, that was the crux, they didn't understand what the lectures were about, they wanted more 












That sequence of complaints set in train a series of evaluations of the course. First, the Human 
Science Students' Council, in response to the complaints, administered a questionnaire to 
students as a mid-term evaluation (in October 2003). The result of the questionnaire was 
reassuring. But by this time, the 'offending' lecturer had completed her module, the frustration had 
subsided somewhat. In response to the statement, "The lecture's oral presentation stimulates 
interest in the topic" 72% of students either agreed or strongly agreed. This was, after all, a new 
lecturer. But there were still ominous signs. In response to the statement, "I understand what is 
required for my assignments", only 56% of students agreed or strongly agreed. And in response 
to the statement, "The level of feedback on my essay/assignment is adequate", only 49% agreed 
or strongly agreed. 
All of which led us (myself and Carmen) to set up a focus group at the end of the course. We 
needed to delve into what had happened in the course, go beyond the cryptic comments which 
students scratch on to course evaluations. We suspected that students had changed over a 
period of five or more years, that we were dealing with a different cohort, a different generation of 
young people. The clearest indication of this, we thought, was their inability to sit still in classes. 
Despite continuing peevish calls to order from lecturers, they persisted in talking to each other 
through and over the lecturer's voice. We had not come across this level of recalcitrance before. 
This was then a first conceptualisation of the 'problem'. The matter at hand was one of discipline. 
This angle was seemingly supported by anecdotal reports coming out of Western Cape high 
schools that significant numbers of teachers were struggling to maintain discipline in classes. 
Many were leaving the profession because they could not cope. Others, who could not leave, 
were suffering disabling levels of stress. I began to compile a list of school psychologists to talk 
to. I started making enquiries on academic literature around school discipline. 
Another evaluation at the end of the course (in November 2003), which differentiated between the 
lecturers, encapsulated what had happened. In response to the statement, "This lecturer gives 
clear and understandable explanations", student agreement (plus strong agreement) was 29% for 
Carmen, and 78% for the second and later one (myself). But it was not that clear. In response to 
another statement, "This lecturer stimUlated my interest in the subject", student response was 
21% positive for Carmen and a meagre 56% for myself. In short, it was by no means clear that 
one lecturer was boring and the other interesting. Students were generally alienated from both. 
So we invited five students from our respective tutorial groups to attend two focus group 
discussions. Somewhat perversely we invited some of the brightest, most articulate group 











happening in the class. The students were asked to respond to two questions: how does 
university work differ from school work? in the first discussion, and. how does sociology differ 
from other disciplines at UCT? in the second discussion. One discussion was facilitated by 
myself, the other by Carmen. Themes that came out of those discussions emphasized a number 
of things: 
a. that the course was far too theoretical with far too little empirical case~study 
material (as exemplified by their course in Social Anthropology); 
b. that the material and the assignments had no connection with student lives 
("where's the me in this?"); 
c. that Oust as the complaint went about Carmen at the beginning of the course) 
students "didn't know what you were talking about and none of us. most of us 
were sitting there going. 'What are you going on about?""; 
d. that the marking was dishearteningly stricter than in other first year courses, and 
students felt that they scored up to 20% less for their sociology assignments. 
With this runup as background, the 2004 version of this course looked a lot different. Carmen was 
no longer part of the teaching team. From lecturing the second 6 weeks of the course or half the 
course. I now lectured the first 9 weeks of a 13~week course. Each of the various sections (there 
were four 3~week sections) started with some connection with the personal lives of students. So, 
the first section on the nature of sociology began with a survey of student attitudes on affirmative 
action, and used those views to illustrate the nature of scientific argument, the nature of social 
science, and the relativizing, debunking, system-relating functions of the sociological imagination. 
Another section on Crime and Deviance began with a survey of what students thought was 'the 
most vile and disgusting crime you can think of', and proceeded from there by showing how 
profoundly sociology opposes such views. (Rape was the overwhelming favourite.) Lectures were 
a lot less theory~driven. I used a lot more illustrative examples. told a lot more stories, made 
much of the counter-intuitive angle of social science. 
It was at this point that I formulated a first version of this dissertation. I had been much taken by 
Shaun Gallagher's discussion of (Gadamer's notion of) the nature of questioning in the social 
sciences (Gallagher. 1992). Following the Socratic model I wanted to pursue what it was to ask 
'the generative question', what the techniques were which one might use to spark off 
transformative experiences in students. To that end I did two things. I started studying the 
Socratic dialogues in some detail. and I arranged for a series of workshops with the course tutors 
on group dynamics. I thought that tutorial discussions were an interesting place to scrutinize the 
way tutors asked questions. and how students responded. I started taping tutorial sessions. I 











and enthusiasm among students. Tutors then met five times in weekly hour-long workshops. The 
first of these comprised an introductory lecture on the principles of group dynamics. Later 
discussions were much more broadly-based reflections on problems which they had experienced 
in running tutorials. 
This take on the project was however overtaken by events. It soon became clear that something 
much more interesting was happening under my nose, among students in the course. I started 
getting signs that the student response to the course was more positive. My perception of body 
language and interactions in class were a first indication that students were engaged and caught 
up in this course in quite a different way from the earlier (2003) version of the course. Quite early 
on in the course one student approached me after a lecture with the question, "But isn't sociology 
dangerous?". When I asked him what this meant, he said "It turns all our usual views upside 
down." 
This impression was strengthened at the mid-term evaluation. A great many students were very 
enthusiastic. I asked them to respond to three questions: 1. What has your experience of 
SOC 105 been this semester? 2. How can this course be improved? 3. What would you 
recommend in this course to others? Among the usual range of responses were several which 
used words like 'eye-opener'. Here is a sample: 
1. "My experience of SOC105 has been so wonderful. It enabled me to learn things that are part 
of my everyday life that I never realized before." 
2. "SOC105 has been an eye-opener for me ... (it) makes one look at the world in a whole new 
perspective. " 
3. "I have found this course fascinating. Finally, I have a better understanding of issues I had 
previously merely accepted and now I can formulate my own opinions." 
4. "It has changed the way I perceive things in life to be. It has made me think about situations 
such as affirmative action in a way I never even thought existed. I originally had no opinion on this 
issue but now hold a strong belief." 
5. "SOC105S has been an eye-opener to me. I have been taken culture, politics, technology and 
many other developments as things that does not affect me or does not need my input but as 
other people's responsibilities. I have now realized that I am part and parcel of everything that 
happens. i.e. globalization." (sic) 
So I began to rethink what my research was about. I saw that Socratic questioning was not really 
about asking cleverly formulated questions. It was much more about the challenge that the social 
sciences poses to public opinion. And that challenge, i.e the way in which sociology was 











formats, only one of which was a grammatical question. In effect, I moved from looking for ways 
to ask a magical 'generative question' (in the future) to investigating ways in which (in the recent 
past) my students' views had been challenged and changed. 
To that end I formulated the end-of-term course evaluation questionnaire to probe beyond the 
mid-term evaluation, for example, what being 'an eye-opener' meant. I asked open-ended 
questions like "Which particular topics made the greatest impression on you? And why? (Please 
write a few lines.)" and "Did this course change your mind on some things? (Please write a few 
lines.)". And students did indeed write a few lines. There was a wealth of comment that appeared, 
much of it quite positive about the course. (These are discussed in some detail in Chapter Four.) 
Now, even though these responses offered a lot more detail than the mid-term list, they 
nevertheless still hid a treasure-house of personal experience, and of individual narratives. I 
wanted to find out what lay behind them. This was then the basis for a second series of focus 
groups run by myself and a research assistant at the end of 2004. The aim was to probe deeper 
into particular stories, to uncover the emotional colour and the conceptual background of these 
embryonic transformations. What were the issues, events, concepts which had made the most 
impact? What did it mean to say that 'this course was an eye-opener'? 
These questions connected with the band of sociological theorizing which formed the basis for 
this course. In the writing of C. Wright Mills, Peter Berger, Anthony Giddens and Zigmunt 
Bauman, the sociological imagination is a mode of thinking which fundamentally confronts 
everyday common sense (Berger, 1966; Giddens, 1989; Baumann 1990; Mills 1959). For many of 
my students at the start of the course, for example, rapists were uniquely evil and sadistic 
individuals intent on indulging their lust and hunger for power. They were mentally unbalanced 
people who needed to be harshly punished. Against such absolutist, individualized, punitive and 
pathologizing views, the sociological imagination presents an approach which is relativizing, 
socially embedded, tolerant and theorized. 
Two bands of theory, then, one from Gadamer's notions of questioning, the other from 
mainstream sociology's sociological imagination. Both present a challenge to everyday public 
opinion, but they come from very different places. Hermeneutics starts with the ongoing 
interaction between historical tradition and everyday life, the creative ferment arising from the 
unceasing meeting of the familiar with the unfamiliar. 
The sociological imagination, by contrast, starts with the way in which society becomes like an 











much of this reification derives from the subtle way in which inequalities of power become 
accepted as normal and routine in social life. 
The way to break this ossification is, for the positivist current in mainstream sociology, through an 
impartial, objective, logical and rigorous method. For the critical current in mainstream sociology, 
by contrast, the way forward is to reveal the hidden workings of power. For one truth is the prize, 
for the other freedom and emanCipation. 
For Gadamer's hermeneutics:!, however, it is not possible to construct a world without prejudice, 
tradition and power. The way towards transformation is to engage in depth with authority and with 
historical roots. It is only through the intimate knowledge of and engagement with the 'alien' that 
fundamental change is possible. It is for this reason that hermeneutics embraces power, attempts 
to show that power has the potential to be creative and generative. Against positivist notions of 
clear and unambiguous truth, hermeneutics proposes perplexity. Against scientific aspirations to 
neat theoretical matrices, hermeneutics proposes messy context-bound case-studies. Against 
universal and eternal principles hermeneutics proposes ongoing and flexible compromise. 
All of this has important implications for research methodology. In this dissertation I utilize focus 
groups as a process of ethnography. That puts considerable emphasis on the group context and 
the naturalistic circumstance of the research. It also focuses on the role of the facilitator in 
creating the framework for generative power. 
At the same time it poses significant challenges to choosing an appropriate method. What kind of 
method is it that precisely targets personal transformation? The principles of ethnography 
(through focus groups) takes us some way in this search, but remains unsatisfactory. In the end, I 
have combined this ethnographic perspective with a version of psychodynamic analysis derived 
from Stuart Hall, and some principles of JUngian psychology. 
It is not by accident then that a dissertation founded in hermeneutics should start with the 
elaboration of a shifting, hard-to-pin-down case-study which poses tantalizing questions rather 
than with a clean theoretical matrix which is mapped on to social reality. 
What does this dissertation do? What is significant about the work that it does? The most 
important aspect of this dissertation is its elaboration and extrapolation of the practical 
pedagogical principles of hermeneutics. This forms part of a much larger project that I have 
2 The term, hermeneutics, is sometimes taken to represent all micro-sociology. This would 
include categories like symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, phenomenology. In this 











pursued in spelling out the (as yet unformulated) pedagogical aspects of hermeneutics (Graaff, 
2004, Graaff et al. 2004). This dissertation focuses in on one aspect of this project, namely the 
notion of transformation. 
But this has taken some work. Gadamer himself distances his philosophy from pedagogy. And 
very few other writers have set out the practical pedagogical implications of hermeneutics. 
Gallagher's treatment is quite philosophical (Gallagher, 1992). Flyvbjerg has much to say about 
the application of phronesis to the social sciences and specifically to research, but says hardly 
anything about teaching, or about qualitative research (Flyvbjerg, 2001). Stewart is a first attempt 
but fairly embryonic (Stewart, 2003). Jardine is useful, although also very philosophical (Jardine, 
1992) Kerdeman is the one person who, in two articles, has pursued this line, elaborating 
specifically the practical implications of transformation and 'meeting the alien' (Kerdeman, 1998, 
2003). I have taken up Kerdeman's ideas, but gone considerably beyond them, distinguishing the 
notion of meeting the alien from meeting the Other, as set out in the work of Stuart Hall and 
Frantz Fanon. Here I have found the principles of Jungian psychology useful to extend those of 
Kerdeman. 
At the level of data analysis there is a similar dearth in guidelines. Gadamer's own research 
practice lies in the direction of anamnesis3, and the excavation of etymological histories, which is 
hardly helpful with transcribed material from interviews. Stuart Hall comes much closer in setting 
out psychodynamic principles of stereotypes and prejudice, but still faUs short in spelling out the 
detail of data analysis (Hall, 1992, 2001). Here too then I have worked to extrapolate Hall's 
principles within the methodologies of ethnography and focus groups, while combining them with 
Jungian inSights. In brief, then, an exploration of the practical aspects of hermeneutics in 
pedagogy in an area where not a great deal has been written. 
There are three further comments to make in (negatively) delineating the outlines of this 
dissertation. The first is that this dissertation does not undertake to spell out the implications for 
practical teaching of this work, although there are clearly such consequences to be drawn. It is 
not in this sense action research. The aim here is rather to enhance the sensitivity of teachers to 
those normally invisible events, the transformations, which occur under their noses. Another way 
to say the same thing is that the word pedagogy in the title of the dissertation, 'a hermeneutic 
approach to pedagogy', refers to the effects of teaching among students rather than an 
exploration of new strategies of teaching. 
3 Anamnesis, for Gadamer, is the process of dis-forgetting, whereby historical cultural traces, 











The second comment to make is that this dissertation has an ambivalent relationship to discourse 
analysis. At one level I try to stay away from discourse analysis because I try to focus in on the 
micro- and situational rather than the macro-sociological, and because I do not concentrate on 
power and hegemony (in the Gramscian sense). From another angle, it is extremely difficult to 
avoid discourse analysis in contemporary qualitative research. Discourse analysis is everywhere. 
In addition, Stuart Hall, whom I have followed in my data analysis, could easily be seen as a 
discourse analyst. Perhaps the best way to say it is that I have not followed through on all the 
discourse analytical aspects of Stuart Hall. 
Finally, while there are hints in this text to ways in which teachers and lecturers are also subject 
to transformation, particularly with regard to the use of power, this is not an area which I intend to 
pursue here. That would need far more space than is available. I concentrate for the moment 











Chapter 2: Theoretical framework: questioning and the Human Sciences 
" ... the logic of the human sciences", says Gadamer, "is a logic of the question". (Gadamer, 
1989:370) This chapter is an investigation of the various forms which questions can take in 
Gadamer's thinking. In one form, living everyday life is a process by which long-held views and 
practices are challenged by (even very slightly) unexpected circumstances. In this form, 
questioning is an ontological condition of existence. We would not be able to exist without this 
ongoing process. 
In a second form, a questioning attitude is a prescription for the good life. A great deal of 
Gadamer's work, Truth and Method, is a meditation on the aspects of just this issue - how to take 
up a questioning attitude, what it is that is being questioned, what the aim of questioning is, how 
questioning relates to dialetics and debate, the roots of questioning in Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle, the central role of practical wisdom or phronesis in this issue. In the chapter which 
follows I investigate both forms of questioning and the various issues which arise from them. 
A third form of questioning arises from Socrates' dialectical method. This leads us to a series of 
considerations. One is the difference between constructive and destructive or eristic questioning. 
There is no guarantee that questioning will itself be generative. Another concerns the nature of 
the perplexity which Socrates induces through his questions. It is a perplexity intended to 
encourage people to use their own voices. Yet another relates to the nature of challenges and 
their grammatical forms. Finally, there is the way in which questions integrate with practical 
situations. This is a matter of theory and praxis. 
Let us consider these aspects in more detail. 
Ontological Questioning 
Gadamer's discussion of the matter of questioning starts by confirming the ontological status of 
questioning in hermeneutics. That means that everyday life is constituted by the challenge which 
the unfamiliar poses to the familiar, it is the task set for the accumulated knowledge and 
experience which we have in their meeting with the problems and tasks of everyday living. Life 
gets lived at that luminous edge where consciousness is engaged in the practical issue of getting 
on with the not-quite-expected problems of daily living. Those practical issues might entail making 











Plato (through his mouthpiece, Socrates) points to this very issue in what has now come to be 
known as Meno's paradox in teaching. In Socrates' words: 
It is thus impossible for a man to inquire either into what he knows, or into what he does 
not know. He cannot inquire into what he knows; for he knows it, and there is no need for 
inquiry into a thing like that. Nor would he inquire into what he does not know; for he does 
not know what it is he is to inquire into. (Allen, 1984:163) 
This is a paradox which engages Gadamer centrally, and for which he finds an answer in the 
notion of the fusion of horizons. In their everyday lives, people always find themselves embedded 
in a particular tradition. They start with what they know. But they are, on an ongoing basis, 
confronted by the challenge of daily reality, i.e. what they do not know. They solve this by 
application, by applying the knowledge that they have to situations and problems that they have 
not encountered before. The fusion of horizons between the known and the unknown is an 
ontological condition of existence. Meno's paradox is being solved at every moment of our living. 
The issue for teaching, then, is not whether old principles can be applied in new situations, but 
how to use the exercise of application most fruitfully. 
Prescriptive Principles 
The second form of questioning concerns a move from the ontological to the prescriptive. This 
move starts with the recognition that in everyday living, negotiating the challenges of living has 
the potential for taking on a mechanical and lifeless character. People can and do develop 
technical formulae for solving problems even with issues of considerable importance. In this 
mode of thinking the aim is, via rigorous and disciplined method, to find final truth such that no 
more needs to be said, to achieve mastery and closure, 'to render the world a harmless picture 
for our indifferent and disinterested perusal' (Jardine, 1992: 119). It is in this sense that Gadamer 
says 'the method of modern science is characterized from the start by a refusal: namely, to 
exclude all that which actually eludes its own methodology and procedures". (quoted in (Jardine, 
1992: 126) I n this situation, says Jardine, the task of hermeneutics is to 'return life to its original 
difficulty'. to re-instill in the negotiation of life a sense of personal engagement and value, to bring 
back a consideration of the bigger issues of living like the meaning of life, death, birth. pain. or 
mortality. To the extent that these issues are not amenable to final solutions. engaging them 
entails a necessary measure of ambiguity and uncertainty. Translated into questioning. this 












Kerdeman has a slightly different interpretation of Gadamer's view of change. (Kerdeman, 2003). 
For her, the essence of transformation is that people are 'brought up sharp'. They discover that 
their long~held views are mistaken, that they need to re~assess their opinions in a way that is 
unforeseen and indeed unforeseeable. "Being pulled up short discloses attitudes, qualities and 
behaviours we would prefer to disown, deny or recognize only insofar as we project4 them on to 
others." (Kerdeman, 2003:296) Being pulled up short is to puncture a condition of self-inflation 
which fails to recognize the limitations of being human. 
"What a man (sic) has to learn through suffering is not this or that particular thing, but 
insight into the limitation of humanity ... into the absoluteness of the barrier that separates 
man (sic) from the divine." (Gadamer quoted in (Kerdeman, 2003:297) 
In the parable of the prodigal son, a young man goes out from his father's home, squanders his 
inheritance, and finally finds himself feeding someone else's pigs. Here Gadamer talks of the 
meeting the alien. 
It is oneself that one finds in the alien, even while feeding with the swine. There is always 
this sense of chastening and deflation when we discover that there is something more, 
something other than ourselves. But even in the humiliation of recognizing oneself in the 
other, there is also a sense of elation and expansion, of coming into one's own that 
Scripture depicts as homecoming and coming into one's inheritance. (Weinsheimer, 
1985:70) 
It is worth underlining that this meeting the alien is not the same as meeting the Other. In its most 
common form, meeting the Other derives from Freudian theory, the Other being the suppressed 
image of a significant Other, like a parent (Hall, 2001)5. As used by Edward Said. the Other is that 
which is feared and/or secretly desired. projected on to other (often foreign) people but likewise 
suppressed (Hall. 1992). Meeting the Other here sounds more like the conversion of Paul on the 
road to Damascus (rather than the prodigal son), that which was hated and feared turns into 
4 I will argue below that reclaiming projection is not the same as being pulled up short. I think 
Kerdeman is confusing two different things here. 
S Hall notes that there are at least three notions of the Other alongside Freud's. One derives from 
the Saussurian notion that meaning derives from syntagmatic difference or absence. Another is 
8akhtinian. originating in the dialogic notion of meaning. i.e. that meaning is created only in 
dialogue with others. Mary Douglas's structuralism is a third. In this notion what is Other 
(fearsome. disgusting. outrageous) is that which is out of its place. Hall, S. (2001) "The Spectacle 
of the Other." In Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices(Ed. Hall. S.) 











something to be respected. Meeting the alien is more a deflation of hubris and arrogance than the 
transformation of hatred and disgust (Samuels et al.. 1986:81; Edinger, 19726). 
In Fanon's postcolonial theory the Other is seen through Manichean thinking. the oscillation 
between stark alternatives. The victims of colonial oppression either give over their own identity to 
take on European culture. or they reject all that is European in a version of black consciousness 
or Negritude. In the hands of Hall and Said, the construction of the Other is often the action of the 
colonial oppressor. The virtue of Fanon's position is that the oppressed participate equally in 
fixed, stereotypical and static thinking. But Fanon warns that meeting the Other is not a simple 
matter. Conceptions of the Other are cemented by social power and by deep psychological roots. 
So, Fanon enjoins revolutionary intellectuals to participate in the 'zone of occult instability' which 
is deadened, self-hating peasant culture to construct instead a 'fighting culture'. In this way 
historical symbols whose roots are hidden (occult) are mobilized and enlivened to confront the 
practical solution of contemporary and immediate problems. He warns that pessimistic and sterile 
culture is held in place by (colonial) violence, and that this violence will first need to be broken for 
any movement to occur (Fanon, 1968; Gibson 2003). Inasmuch as Fanon is addreSSing a familiar 
problem of fixed thinking here, he is underlining that an Other does not shift simply by the 
presentation of alternatives. Others are held in place both by power, and by deep emotional 
bonds, what Wendy Holway calls 'investments' (Holway, 2001 ( 
In Lacanian theory (which frequently forms the base of postmodernism) the construction of the 
Other is seen as a futile attempt to bind the ontological fracturing of the specular self. In this 
situation the ethical teacher aims to create conditions for holding the tension in this fracturing, and 
this is done by demonstrating the slippages and uncertainties in language. Pickering speaks here 
of 'privileging the ruptures of form and the subversive potential of ambivalence as a political 
weapon" (Pickering, 2001 :159). 
The point of this brief cook's tour of forms of Othering is to put Gadamer's notion of meeting the 
alien in some perspective, to pin down its particularity, and to indicate the variety of practical 
6 Jung's thoughts on religion have uncannily strong echoes of Gadamer's notion of meeting the 
alien. ''To this day God is the name by which I designate all things which cross my willful path 
violently and recklessly, all things which upset my subjective views, plans and intentions and 
change the course of my life for better or worse." (Jung quoted in Edinger p.1 01) And on p.49 
"For this reason the experience of the self is always a defeat for the ego." 
7 It is a critique of Foucault that the effect of discourse happens too easily, without the workings 
of socialization, or of deeper roots into the unconscious. Nixon, S. (1997) "Exhibiting Masculinity." 
In Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices. (Ed, Hall, S.) Sage 











action which flows from the variety of definition. I return to the matter of strategy below. Let us 
now return to Gadamer. 
For Gadamer, the ideal of the good life, the summum bonum, is the pursuit of phronesis, or 
practical wisdom. Phronesis stands in contrast with episteme, or pure theory, on the one hand, 
and techne, or technicism, on the other. While there is much debate around the definition of 
phronesis, for our purposes, it entails the following elements: (1) it retains a connection with 
questions of normative import, it asks, 'is this worthwhile?', 'where are we going?'; (2) it starts 
from practical situations or case studies rather than from theoretical principles, it promotes 'thick 
knowledge' as a basis from which to pursue questions of value; it engages in contemporary 
dialogues and debates, participates in public debate; (3) it promotes open-ended conversation 
rather than conclusive solutions, it continues asking questions (Gallagher, 1992); (4) it is a 
holistic, rhetorical, tactful approach to knowledge and skill rather than one pursuing mechanical, 
principled, rule-bound practice (Flyvbjerg, 2001) B; (5) it puts people in the way of transformation, 
and more specifically in the way of being 'startled out of themselves', of being 'pulled up short', of 
being caught unawares (Kerdeman, 1998). 
In an illuminating discussion Gadamer compares techne and phronesis, technical skill and 
practical wisdom (Gadamer, 1989). Technical skill is itself, like good interpretation, and like 
practical wisdom. continually applied to real problems. The question is, how does this kind of 
application differ from that in the process of phronesis. Remember here Gadamer's bigger 
purpose in critiquing positivism and technicism, in returning life to its original difficulty. What then 
is the problem with technical skill? 
Gadamer has three things to say in critique of technical skill, in comparing it with phronesis. First, 
technical skill is static in its application. Phronesis, like the law of precedents, moves and learns 
as it is applied. It is never the same skill, or the same principles, which are being applied to 
concrete problems. Every new application changes our understanding of the principle. 
Second. unlike techne, phronesis draws in moral considerations in the making of decisions. 
Practical wisdom entails the quite delicate maintenance of personal proportion and balance in the 
making of judgment. It is as much self.·deliberation as practical problem-solving. 
8 In his discussion of phronesis Flyvbjerg includes the critical investigation of power as a 
prominent element. i.e. a strong critical theory component. He puts the work of Foucault 
alongside that of Aristotle as exemplary of good research. As I shall argue further on, there is no 
power vacuum at the heart of hermeneutics. In some ways hermeneutics is more radically critical 
than Foucault's critical theory - which is not to say that Foucault is not a brilliant example of 
anamnesis. Flyvbjerg, B. (2001) Making Social Science Matter: why social inquiry fails and how it 











Finally, and most importantly, it follows that phronesis, or moral judgment, is about entering into 
the situation of the other. Technicians can fix faulty spark-plugs in an engine without 'entering 
into' the state of the engine, without asking what the engine is being used for. Phronesis, says 
Gadamer, by contrast, involves forbearing and forgiveness, an attempt to put oneself in other 
shoes. The practical technician, much like the Sophists, can make something out of any situation. 
He is, says Gadamer, 'a man who is capable of anything' for he has no morals, is totally given 
over to pragmatism. It is this which is most problematic about technicism. 
We should remember that when Gadamer talks about moral judgment, about forbearing and 
forgiveness, he does not mean entering the mind of the author of a text. He calls this, somewhat 
critically, an uncertain and 'divinatory' process. What people end up saying always escapes what 
they originally intended. It is the text itself to which we submit ourselves, which one approaches 
with respect and empathl. 
How do these philosophical principles translate into practical pedagogy? This is not an easy 
question to answer for two main reasons. One is that Gadamer himself puts a distance between 
his work and that of pedagogy. Gadamer says, for example, "Interpretation is not something 
pedagogical" [quoted in (Gallagher, 1992:2)]10. The second is that much of Gadamer's writing is 
ontological, or put more carefully, there is a very fuzzy boundary in Gadamer between the 
ontological and the prescriptive. Inasmuch as teaching entails a strong moral and prescriptive 
component, it is difficult to deduce principles of good teaching practice from the conditions of 
human existence. 
Despite these difficulties there is quite a lively prescriptive literature that is based on Gadamer , 
some of it also on teaching (See for example, the work of Gallagher, Rorty, Taylor, and (Graaff, 
2004; Noel, 2001, Taylor, 2002; Rorty, 1980; Gallagher, 1992). Without entering that debate in 
detail, the following are principles of good teaching derived from Gadamer's work, in general, and 
phronesis, in particular. 
9 Compare the similar stance by Clifford Geertz who rejected the notion of an intuitive entering of 
other people's souls. For him, the task of ethnography was to analyze "the symbolic forms in 
terms of which, in each place, people actually represented themselves to themselves and to one 
another". (quoted in Schwandt, 1994:123) 
10 Jardine differs quite sharply from Gadamer where he says 'hermeneutics links up essentially 
rather than accidently with education' Jardine, D. (1992) "Reflections on Education, 
Hermeneutics, and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics as a Restoring of Life to Its Original Difficulty." In 
Understanding Curriculum as Phenomenological and Deconstructed Text(Eds, Pinar, W. and 











1. Teaching should be a process of sensitive listening to students. So, for example, 
assessment should be flexible to ongoing student responses, it should be a conversation 
between teachers and students. It should be continuous assessment that shifts to 
accommodate new enthusiasms and difficulties. Likewise, aSSignment grading should 
happen rapidly (turnaround time of a matter of days rather than weeks) with attention 
paid to detailed feedback comment. 
2. Learning is a matter of ongoing practical execution. Students should be engaging hands-
on with material via discussion, multiple exercises and assignments. Academic skills 
require bodily engagement with the routines, and procedures of the discourse, or in 
Bourdieu's terms, the habitus of academia. 
3. Curriculum content needs to draw strongly on contemporary and current debate around 
public issues and case studies. Theoretical principles follow on from, rather than, precede 
such empirical material. One of the dangers of the social sciences is dogmatiC 
prescription on the basis of theoretical fiat. Theory needs continuous adaptation to new 
situations. 
4. The skills of logical argument need to be combined with committed rhetoric. In practical 
terms, students need to practice also a range of writing styles that include journalism, 
advocacy, report-writing, and letters to the newspaper. The social sciences need to 
partiCipate in moral and political issues rather than Olympian impartiality and objectivity 
(who ever decided that the gods of Olympus did not take sides in human affairs?). 
5. The outcomes of teaching cannot be planned. Individuals respond to the curriculum in an 
infinite variety of ways. Students can only be 'put in the way' of learning. There can be 
very little 'road-map' planning of the kind which states (confidently) "at the end of this 
course students will be able to ... ". Kerdeman argues that a great deal of contemporary 
teaching which emphasizes competence and mastery might work to contradict precisely 
the disposition to be pulled up short. In the end, it is extremely difficult to teach something 
that is so unpredictable. One is left, she says, with teachers who themselves can be 
pulled up short, who illustrate and model by their own actions what this means 
(Kerdeman, 2003:308) 
6. Good teaching entails personal transformation, for both teachers and students. 
Curriculum content and pedagogic practice needs to engage the participants in the 
learning process on an immediate and intimate basis, to speak to their everyday 
concerns. 
The first four of the above principles I have discussed in some detail elsewhere (Graaff, 2004, 
Graaff et aI., 2004). This dissertation focuses on the last two aspects, the nature and origins of 











First Year Sociology's Agenda 
In the previous section I have argued that Gadamer considers the human sciences to constitute 
two questions, one ontological and the second prescriptive. In this section I consider how far 
these prescriptive questions are reflected in a first year sociology course which uses concepts 
like debunking, relativizing and system-relating in elaborating the sociological imagination. It is 
worth underlining that Gadamer addresses the human sciences, geisteswissenschaft, rather than 
merely the social sciences. We should expect then that Gadamer's questions would be posed in 
a much broader and encompassing sense. 
Earlier on I indicated that 'mainstream' positivist and critical sociology strive towards, on the one 
hand, an objective, impartial and scientific method, and on the other, to unveil the hiding places of 
power. Both often talk about undermining the naturalized and routines assumptions of everyday 
common sense. At this fairly superficial level, hermeneutics pursues a very similar agenda. It also 
aims to challenge, ask questions of, public opinion, the dOXB. Once one goes into more detail, 
however, it is evident that these three streams of theory are actually pursuing quite different 
agenda's. 
What were the explicit aims, then, of the first year sociology course? In the language of Peter 
Berger, the sociological imagination aims to do three things: first, to debunk the public images 
which individuals and social entities present of themselves (Berger, 1966). This parallels critical 
theory's goal of unveiling and undermining the subtleties of power in society. Examples used in 
the course were the awful 'sweatshop' conditions which lie behind glossy advertising; the salaries 
paid to company CEO's compared to those of their unskilled workers; Marx's depiction of religion 
as the opium of the masses; Marx's analysis of the compulsions and coercions of the so-called 
'free' market. 
The second aim was to reJativize opinions which see themselves as unique and absolute by 
comparing them with equivalent cultural phenomena in other times and other societies. This 
breaks down into two contrary moves. One is to de-familiarize things that seem very ordinary and 
banal - for example, to bring out the oddness and curiousness of a can of Coke or a cup of 
coffee. This is a quote from the textbook. 
What kind of activity is it when, for example, people sit around a table, talking, 'having a 
cooldrink'. And how would the social situation change if they were 'having a smoke' with 











from people 'having a cooldrink'. And they are different again from people 'having a beer' 
or those 'having a cup of tea' or those 'having a glass of champagne' (Graaff, 2001) 
The other task in relativizing was to familiarize what seems foreign and outrageous. One example 
here was the torture of Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison in Bhagdad. The media at the time 
had made a great deal of these incidents, of the hypocrisy of the US invasion on the pretext of 
bringing democracy and human rights to an erstwhile oppressive dictatorship, of the outrage at 
the abandonment of just those human rights and the Geneva Convention dealing with the 
treatment of prisoners. 
In lectures during this course I took a different line. I questioned the implication that the US was 
unique or singularly evil in perpetrating these atrocities. After all, war is war. Soldiers are taught to 
hate their enemies. This is the way war has always been, back through thousands of years. What 
did one expect? Which is not to condone the violations, just that, when ordinary members of 
society, 'like you and me', are put in situations of violent conflict, that's what happens. Under 
extreme pressure, anyone can quite quickly lose the semblances of civil, decent behaviour. 
It is at the end of this particular lecture that a student approaches me. "Isn't sociology 
dangerous?", he asks. , ask, "What does that mean?". "Well", he replies, "it takes all people's 
ordinary beliefs and turns them upside down". 
Another example of this approach concerned the topic of Crime and Deviance. At the start of the 
module on Crime and Deviance in the course, I asked students to respond to three questions: (1) 
Who do you think are the most vile/disgusting/despicable criminals? List one or two types. (2) 
What do you think they are up to, these types, when they are committing this crime? (3) How do 
you think they should be dealt with? Here are some answers. 
"I feel that sexual offenders like child molesters etc ... are the most vile criminals. 'Public hanging 
is the only answer. ' Rape is also a disgusting crime. Its not about sex its about power and control. 
They should be castrated as their punishment. " 
"1. Rapist. 2. Revenge ... 3. They thrown (sic) in prison for Iife/ their penis should be chopped off 
like the bible says "If your hand causes you to sin, remove it. II The word rapist should be written 
on their forehead. " 
"1. a) pedophiles b) mercenary killers 2. They are sick people who are selfish and convince 
themselves that it is okay. They mess up innocent people's lives. 3. I think that both types act fully 











punished accordingly. Savagely. They should be put in solitary confinement for 30 years then 
death sentenced." 
"1. Murderers and rapists. 2. murderers are driven by hate some are just psychotic, rapist I 
believe are driven by the sick pleasure they derive and a need for power over their victim. 3. I 
think both murderers and rapists should be tortured and made to suffer and they shouldn't be 
killed. They should just be made to suffer & get a glimpse into how they made others suffer. " 
These are precisely the kinds of views that sociology would aim to relativize. They are examples 
of absolutist, highly emotional, punitive, pathologizing and individualized thinking around a 
sociologica! problem. It is exactly against this kind of view that a social, culture and structural view 
of crime would be pitted. 
In attempting to follow this agenda, one class discussion (in reconstructed and summarized form) 
went something like this. 
Lecturer: "What is the rapist up to while committing this crime?". 
Student A: "Rape is a matter of power being exercised over the woman. It is not a case of sex." 
Lecturer: "Why is it that men need to exercise their power over women?" 
Student B: "Because they have insecure male identities?': 
Lecturer: "If rape is an exercise in compensating for damaged identity, what then would be the 
woman's equivalent of committing rape?" 
Student C: "When she beats her children." 
Lecturer: "What would be other examples of men compensating for insecure identities?" 
Student 0: "The school bully". 
Lecturer: "Who are the people who are school bullies?" 
Student E: "The under-achievers." 
Lecturer: "What would be the effect of punishing someone with a damaged identity?" 
Student F: "It would aggravate his humiliation and increase his desire to commit rape." 
In this sequence, rape is being juxtaposed with equivalent acts. What is strange and monstrous is 
being familiarized. It is no longer a unique, or a uniquely horrible, act. It is one of many, it is a 
symptom of a deeper lying problem - insecure and damaged self-identity. There are many such 
symptoms visible in the world. More importantly, there is the hint that many ordinary people do 
just these things as well. This exercise is similar to the example above on the torture of prisoners 
in Abu Ghraib prison. It is a strategy of de-absolutizing. At the same time it problematizes the 
knee-jerk response of vengeance against the perpertrator, "castrate them", "lock them up and 











readings, students encountered the individual and cultural lives of particular rapists, the 
circumstances under which they had grown up, the way their parents had treated them. In short, 
cardboard cutout stereotypes confronted real-life individuals. 
It was in response to this kind of information that students could say later on, "I had not realized 
that a criminal can be anybody and that criminals need my support and care ... I now look at the 
homeless and other marginalized groups differently"; and "It made me empathize with (some) 
rapists and understand where deviant people are coming from." 
Up to this point I have considered two legs of the sociological imagination, debunking and 
relativizing. The third leg of the sociological imagination is to show how seemingly free-floating 
entities connect up into wider societal systems and theoretical frameworks, which I have called 
system-relating. One way to do this is to show how apparently impersonal phenomena 'out there' 
have very tangible personal effects 'in here'. So, in the case of globalization, lectures focused at 
the micro level on the new religions, psychopathologies, identities, and entertainment which 
accompanied the macro-'juggernaut'. 
It is from this system-relating background that we get responses like the following in the Course 
Evaluation. "SOC105S has been an eye-opener to me. I have been taken culture, politics, 
technology and many other developments as things that does not affect me or does not need my 
input but as other people's responsibilities. I have now realized that I am part and parcel of 
everything that happens. Le. globalization."(sic) 
How close is this sociological agenda to the one posed by Gadamer? At a certain level there a 
great many overlaps. When a student asks, "Isn't sociology dangerous?" or writes that the course 
was 'an eye-opener", or says "I don't take things at face-value any more", it is public opinion or 
the doxa which is being questioned. When students say (on p.37) "I do not have absolute truths" 
or everything is not black and white" or later on, that this lack of closure is 'frustrating', there is a 
level of perplexity. When a student says "I had not realized that a criminal can be anybody", she 
is meeting the alien in a very significant way. 
But what kinds of transformation are these? Are they significant shifts or are they merely ripples 












One way to investigate the nature of these transformations is though a psychodynamic approach, 
following Stuart Hall (Hall, 2001). Seen through this lens the process which students undertake in 
this course can be seen as the movement from stereotype to empathy, from anger to 
understanding, from repression and projection to a meeting with the Other. Stereotypes function 
to essentialize, reduce and naturalize. That means, that they reduce a phenomenon to one or two 
characteristics which are said to represent the whole. Stereotypes simplify and exaggerate. They 
work to exclude all those characteristics which do not fit the essence. And those characteristics 
are fixed. The attempt is to anchor a world in which foundations feel unstable, vulnerable to the 
temptations of precisely that which is being exorcised (Hall, 2001 :257; Pickering, 2001 :79). In 
practical terms, students start by saying of rapists, that they are monsters who are consumed by 
lust and sadism, and should be tortured, castrated and branded. They end by saying 'I 
understand that criminals also need my empathy'. 
Which are the methods by which people shift from one pole to the other? Well, most of the 
methods which we have investigated, either as part of the sociological imagination, or as part of 
Gadamer's questioning, are part of this process. Let us look at these in more detail. 
Seen through a psychodynamic lens, re/ativizing is an important way of challenging stereotypes. 
It is not simply a cognitive skill. It also entails an emotional transformation. For it challenges those 
attitudes which are angry, individualizing, pathologizing and punitive, and presents an alternative 
which ascribes causality to society rather than the individual, and is tolerant of difference. It 
replaces a sense of innate evil with a sense of causation, it replaces a sense of blaming and 
judgment with one of understanding. Emotionally it is less charged and less heated. 
From another angle, relativizing presents alternatives to truths which believe themselves to be 
unique, universal and absolute. Where there was one holy book with a single truth, there are now 
many. Where there was one culture, one nation, one ideology which were inviolable and flawless, 
there are now many, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. Where there was clear 
and absolute truth, there are now grey areas of ambiguity. In these circumstances it is difficult to 
sustain beliefs which are based on unsubstantiated exaggeration, i.e. stereo-types. In discussion 
of theories, for example, this process happens on an implicit basis. Students discover that no 
theory is perfect, that all have their flaws and their benefits, that theorizing is very much a matter 
of debate and weighing up rather than an easy black-and-white judgment. 
Another mechanism which confronts stereotypes is the encounter with the detail of rea/lives. 
Being driven by strong emotions of fear, disgust, and disapproval/outrage, stereotypes tend to 











stereotypes are challenged. In this course students read accounts of individuals who were 
rapists, the communities they came from, and the cultures which produced them, what they said 
about themselves, and how they explained their actions. Rapists suddenly appeared as ordinary 
and small compared to the enormity of the stereotypes. In these cases students can begin to feel 
a measure of sympathy with criminals. The final and most dramatic shift occurs when individuals 
can acknowledge that stereotypes are suppressed parts of themselves and recognize the criminal 
or the monster in themselves, they can themselves feel the temptation to commit crime. This is 
the true case of empathy. 
The mechanism of system-relating has the function of emphasizing the social embeddedness of 
individuals, the degree to which individuals are unable to choose who they are, the hidden nature 
of much of their social behaviour, and the degree to which they cannot carry full responsibility for 
who they are. In psychological terms it serves to deflate the importance of the ego, and the belief 
that the world can be planned and controlled. It serves to underline the inscrutability and 
unpredictability of the unconscious to which they are bound. 
These then are some of the conventional cognitive aspects of the sociological imagination which 
important psychic implications. 
For Gadamer's hermeneutics, on the other hand, there are close parallels with these sociological 
perspectives. Gadamerians speak of perplexity, original difficulty, phronesis and being pulled up 
short. Inasmuch as these arise from philosophical considerations of the good life, they are not far 
removed from psychic concerns in the way that academic concerns are. But they do not operate 
explicitly as mechanisms for challenging stereotypes or doing psychodynamic work. Yet it is a 
fairly simple task to show, for example, the overlap between Kerdeman's 'being pulled up short' 
and what Jungians would call deflation. (Edinger, 1972) Deflation for Edinger, a Jungian writer, is 
the process whereby over-confidence or hubris, is brought back to earth. The Icarus legend of 
what happens to overly ambitious and grandiose high-flyers explains this principle in mythic form. 
The pursuit of perplexity through Socrates' model of dialectic speaks to a similar process. Young 
men come to Socrates with formulaic answers which they take over from their parents or 
teachers. Socrates shows them the inadequacy of this 'dead' approach. He wants them to 
engage in their own way with concepts which live in the world. He wants to return life to its 
original difficulty. Jungians also speak of the danger of fixed dogma, and the need to make moral 
principles live and engage with a moving world. (Edinger, 1972) This is what Nietszche meant 











anchor on human thought. It constricted human creativity within stifling boundaries and it offered 
the false prospect of closure and finality on issues of a moral nature. 
There is a warning here however. Some postmodern writers aim to pursue the ambiguities and 
slippages of language in an unending process of 'differance', a tantalizing offering/distancing of 
the object of theoretical desire, emphasizing 'the ruptures of form and the subversive potential of 
ambivalence' (Pickering, 2001; Bensusan & Shalem, 1994). This is not what I understand the 
pursuit of perplexity to be, or at least not at junior student levels. Briefly put, for first year students, 
their first meeting with the theoretical practices of academia is a disorienting process, a severe 
culture shock, in itself. The first and primary task of teachers at this level is through whatever 
means to establish the temptations of theory, to build the conditions under which theory can be 
seen as desirable. Only once this is accomplished, and this is often no mean undertaking, can the 
task of deferring have any meaning. Taken prematurely, ambiguity can be an excess which 
disheartens, and demotivates students as a first step on their academic journey. Some never 
recover. "I hate theory with a passion" was one senior student's verdict to me. 
Fanon's solution of engaging in 'the zone of occult instability' to build a 'fighting' culture, seems to 
offer more promise. For it harnesses the resources of existing (student) culture and identity to 
grapple with contemporary and practical problems. It works with the excitement of immediate 
engagement and of group enterprise to tackle issues of intimate importance. This is where, in this 
course, the importance of personal engagement lay, I.e. working with, and departing from, 
sources of stUdent Othering, in their views on rape or affirmative action. 
How far have we come, then, in this section? I have put alongside each other the hermeneutic 
and sociological agendas. The sociological imagination's notion of debunking is very close to 
Gadamer's idea of challenging the doxa. The sociological notion of relativizing, for its part, is very 
close to Gadamer's idea of promoting flexibility and of meeting the alien. There is no easy parallel 
in Gadamer with system-relating and theory-building. 
For sociology these are cognitive and political goals. It promotes a particular conceptual take on 
the world, and it pursues emancipation from inequality. Gadamer's notion of meeting the alien 
and of transformation, I argue, goes beyond the conceptual and the political. While Gadamer's 
work starts out as an exercise in epistemology and moral philosophy, it also has strong echoes in 
Jungian psychology, in the affective side. As a matter of pedagogic strategy it proposes a 











The Socratic Dialogues: Grammatical Questions 
Having considered the ontological and prescriptive forms, let us now consider a third form of 
questioning, namely the process of dialectics pursued by Socrates. What Gadamer has to say 
about questioning is substantially influenced by Socrates, or more precisely by Plato's dramatic 
rendering of the Socratic dialogues. Within this rhetorical form, Socrates is put into conversation 
with a range of characters, pursuing his ends by means of persistent questioning. 
In this section I want to draw a number of principles from Socrates' method. One is that 
questioning can be either constructive or destructive. For Plato, enstic or destructive questioning 
(and I understand some postmodern questioning to be of this kind) is immoral. Perplexity 
becomes productive when it leads to transformation. Second, that the kind of question or 
challenge that Gadamer has in mind operates on a very different level from grammatical 
questions. But we shall see later on that the ability to ask good grammatical questions is also an 
important skill for facilitators in focus groups. Third, Gadamer, along with Aristotle, is very critical 
of Plato's notion of pure ideas. For Gadamer, ideas cannot be separated from their use in 
practical application. The important implication here is that each historical period, each 
generation, each individual will come to texts with different issues and different questions. 
Questions cannot be separated from specific contexts. 
Let us start with Socrates' dialectical method. Here is a brief example. Socrates is talking to a 
young man, Meno, and they are examining the nature of virtue (Allen, 1984: 154). Socrates is 
pursuing the point that, in looking for a definition of virtue (and Socrates/Plato spends a lot of time 
looking for definitions), one cannot have a range of virtues. If it is real virtue, it must be the same 
in all cases. 
Soc: ... Didn't you say that a man's virtue is to manage a city well and a woman's a 
house? 
Meno: Yes, I did. 
Soc: Well, is it possible to manage city, house or anything else well, without managing it 
temperately and justly? 
Meno: Surely not. 
Soc: Now, if people manage justly and temperately, they do so by reason of justice and 
temperance? 
Meno: Necessarily. 
Soc: So both men and women alike have need of the same things, namely justice and 











Meno: It appears they do. 
Soc: What about a child or an old man. Could they be good if they were intemperate or 
unjust? 
Meno: Surely not. 
Soc: Only if temperate and just? 
Meno: Yes. 
Soc: Then all human beings are good in the same way: for they become good by 
obtaining these things. 
There are a number of interesting things to note about this strip of dialogue. First, it occurs 
against the background of a very similar-seeming process of question and answer used by 
Plato's antagonists, the Sophists. However, their aim, in Plato's eyes, was quite destructive. It 
was to make other people look stupid, and often to elicit the applause of an audience in 
attendance, whether this was in a court of law, or in the legislature, or in a class of students. 
Plato, then, makes a clear distinction between cooperative, helpful dialectics, on the one hand, 
and eristic or destructive dialogue, on the other. Plato brings this point home with some force in 
the Euthydemus where Socrates is put into dialogue with two 'smart-arse' Sophists, Euthydemus 
and Dyonysodorus. In the process he demonstrates, with some gentleness, how one might elicit 
an enthusiasm for philosophy and for the pursuit of virtue in a young student (Guthrie, 
1975:270(Shorey, 1933:160-68). Questioning is not necessarily or always helpful. 
I return to this issue in two different places further on. One concerns the process of facilitation run 
by a facilitator in focus groups. In their direction of the discussions in these groups and in their 
questioning facilitators can elicit detailed and quite intimate responses from participants, or they 
can produce defensiveness and boredom. As Gadamer emphasizes, asking questions is quite a 
skilled activity. The second connecting issue that I will discuss later is the matter of generative 
power. I will argue that critical theory follows a hermeneutic of suspicion concerning power, while 
hermeneutics follows a hermeneutic of faith. One assumes that power is necessarily destructive 
and oppressive. The other acknowledges the possibility of fruitfulness in power. 
Another way of saying the same thing, is to note that this strip of dialogue occurs in response to a 
definition of virtue given by Meno. If questioning can be either constructive or destructive, what 
kind of questioning is helpful? Let us consider Socrates' wider project here. As I have indicated, 
Meno, following the philosopher Gorgias, gives a string of examples in lieu of a definition. Virtue 
for a man is one thing, virtue for a woman is another, and yet another for children, or an old man, 
or a slave, says Meno. Socrates is well aware that this is what Gorgias thinks, and wants Meno to 











inadequate it is (which is what is under way in our strip of dialogue above), and then ask for 
another. Meno complies by reciting another one from Gorgias. Socrates follows the same 
procedure. He repeats this procedure another three or four times until Meno, in some 
exasperation, says: 
Socrates, I kept hearing before I ever met you that you are yourself in perplexity, and 
cause perplexity in others. And now I think you've cast a spell over me; I am utterly 
subdued by enchantment, so that I too have become full of perplexity .... (Allen, 
1984:162) 
It is a central principle of Socratic dialogue that formulaic responses cannot stand unchallenged. 
And this rhymes precisely with Gadamer's critique of positivism's technicist approach to problems 
(Gallagher, 1992:152). It follows also from this that we should not expect Socrates' dialogues to 
provide easy or final answers. It is significant that many of these dialogues end unresolved. They 
do not have clear answers to the issues involved. Indeed, Socrates appears at times to be little 
more than willfully pedantic. In fact, it is part of Plato's strategy in writing the dialogues that he 
returns to issues time and again, makes some progress along the way, but only gives some 
finality to this in his later writings, Republic and Laws (Shorey, 1933:73). Returning life to its 
original difficulty means to make it 'full of perplexity' and a path to transformation. It is this end-
purpose which makes the difference between constructive and destructive questions, and which 
rescues Socrates from pedantry. 
The third point to make here concerns the nature of Socrates's questions. It is clear that the 
important 'questions' which Socrates is asking are not questions in any grammatical sense. They 
should much rather be seen as challenges. In other words, questions can be posed in many 
formats, and only one of them entails a question mark at the end of the sentence. Conversely, the 
grammatical form of the question (with a question mark at the end of the sentence) can do a 
whole of things other than asking a question. If I say to my child, "Won't you take the dog 
outside?", I am not asking for information or even challenging. It is rather a command in question 
format. Likewise, it is quite evident, when reading Socrates' strip of dialogue above, that he is not 
really asking questions. The series of (seeming) questions is in effect a lecture on a particular 
topic while checking to see that the student has understood the argument so far. The real 
question, or challenge, occurs at a much more subtle level. Socrates is challenging Meno's 
adherence to formulaic definitions of virtue, but that specific question is never posed in so many 











Now, while this is a seemingly obvious comment to make on the nature of (grammatical) 
questions and challenges, it has important implications for the way in which one conducts 
research around questions in teaching. Because it is no longer a matter of when and how literal 
questions are asked, but rather the more subtle ways in which stUdent modes of thinking are 
challenged. 
While Gadamer is much influenced by Plato and Socrates, he also has serious problems with 
them. Most of these problems can be encapsulated in the differences that they have with 
Aristotle, and more specifically, Aristotle's notion of application. In brief. Plato works with a notion 
of pure ideas which can be attained by diligent questioning, by removing the multiple veils 
entailed in everyday living, and by eventually winning through to the ideal. Often these pure 
ideals, for Plato, can be expressed in very precise mathematical form. Education for Plato 
entailed a great deal of training in mathematics and geometry. 
For Aristotle, however, the principles of knowledge do not float in supreme transcendence, 
separated from particular situations. As in law, principles are guidelines which need to be applied 
in practice, filled out and brought to fruition, in real life situations. So also, in living the good life. 
virtue, for Aristotle is not something that can be defined prior to their insertion into concrete 
problems and issues. 
Gadamer affirms this principle of application with some vigour with regard to hermeneutics. 
Interpretation and understanding do not occur in a vacuum. They are bound by the particular 
historical circumstances of the interpreter and with regard to particular issues and problems. In an 
ontological sense, then, interpretation is always about something and addressed to someone, 
always has a time- and place-bound context within which it happens. This is also the tradition 
which encapsulates all our actions, provides the starting point and ground for our existence. 
But also from a prescriptive point of view Gadamer wants to underline that good interpretation 
cannot follow inflexible rules, follow a 'pregiven universal'. The text which one is interpreting is not 
dogmatically given in its meaning. Texts should provide the guide. They should operate lightly as 
an 'image' (p317), 'schema' (320) or 'sketch' in the direction they give to interpretation. Each 
person comes to a text with different questions, a different background. and a different audience 
in mind. Each person should make questions her own. 'We are genuinely responsible for 
ourselves only when we challenge the ready-made answers provided to us by others." 











Interpretation is not a matter of reconstructing the meanings intended by the author or even, 
going one step back, of reconstructing the real (historical) events to which a text might refer. It is 
rather a matter of inquiring as to the question behind the text, to which the text is an answer. 
What Gadamer means by this is that texts (or events as texts) occur within a broader historical 
context, are given meaning by that context, and that those contexts go way beyond what actors 
or authors intend. Authorial intentions are a poor indication of social meaning because what 
people intend is always outstripped by what happens. 
However, 'historical context', the 'meaning of what happens', is itself not an eternally given truth, 
but one reconstructed each time an interpreter approaches the text at hand. It is a central part of 
the consciousness of historical effectiveness (wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein) that the 
interpreter understands her own location in the nature of the questions being asked. ''Thus the 
relation of question and answer is, in fact. reversed. The voice that speaks to us from the past -
whether text, work, trace - itself poses a question and places our meaning in openness." 
(Gadamer, 1989:374) It is in this sense that interpretation, asking questions, is a matter of self-
understanding. And that self-understanding is enhanced when they are genuinely self-
constructed questions. One constructs oneself most effectively when the questions one asks are 
one's own, not those provided by public opinion. 
What does all of this tell us about teaching? As time- and place-contexts (Le. traditions) change 
so will understanding and interpretation. There is no fixed and eternal truth to be applied through 
bureaucratic fiat. There is no fixed and eternal theory which floats supremely above practical 
reality. As one formulation has it, theory follows on from thick description, not vice versa. 
Compare Geertz's idea that "theoretical formulations hover so low over the interpretations they 
govern that they don't make much sense or hold much interest apart from them" (quoted in 
Schwandt, 1994:123) 
At the same time, Gadamer is not a relativist. It is not the case that 'anything goes'. Just as 'a 
man who is capable of anything' is seen as without morals, so interpretation also cannot draw 
anything at all from a text. One must hold on to principles/texts as guides, as 'schemata', as 
'images'. However flexible, however light their touch, they do provide a touchstone in the shifting 
process of application. Likewise the human sciences cannot proclaim any truth. There is still a 
place for systemic theorizing, for the classics and the canon, and for moral judgment. 
Let us now turn our attention away from destructive and constructive questioning, to the matter of 











The exercise of power 
There are, for our purposes, two broad notions of power in the social sciences. One derives from 
critical theory and it is seen as the source of oppression, inequality, and domination. In the form 
of authority, seen as legitimated power or hegemony (in Gramsci's sense), it interweaves into 
individual lives in very subtle and delicate ways. Individuals come to accept unequal power as 
normal, routine, naturalized parts of their lives. It is the role of critical theory (and of critical 
pedagogy) to unveil these interstitial, delicate, veiled yet crucial layers of power. 
The other notion of power is a positive one. It sees power as fruitful, productive and creative. 
Some writers call it voluptuous or rhizotomous power. In this section I counterpose these two 
types, and show how this dissertation is based on the second positive notion 11. 
Thesen's analysis of a pedagogic event in a foundation course at UCT gives us a detailed and 
practical example of the critical notion of power (Thesen 2004). In this event, a lecturer presents 
students with a photograph from an exhibition, and introduces alongside it the author of the 
photograph, the photographer. But he challenges them to make their own interpretation of it, to 
own the image, to see him, the lecturer, as just another interpreter. "Shakespeare is dead" he 
says. And students comply (perhaps predictabIY),"l'm concerned that we're working through 
Robert's (the lecturer's) eyes", says one. "He's throwing his weight around", says another. They 
parody, make jokes about, him, use sarcasm, take the mickey out of him. In all of these ways the 
lecturer's authority is deflated, punctured, unraveled. demythologized and students practice their 
own embryonic voices. (Contradictorily, as Thesen shows, this lecturer bolsters his own authority 
by calling into question the authority of academia. of all lecturers. He presents himself as the 
compelling and attractive rebel. But that comment in itself further chases down the possibilities for 
power to hide itself.) In short, this is an example of sophisticated critical theory doing what it ought 
to do. 
Now, hermeneutics, in general. and Gadamer. in particular, are often accused by critical theorists 
of not dealing with the phenomenon of power (How. 1995; Bernstein 1983: 156; Warnke, 1987). 
Where Gadamer does deal with power he, quite provocatively, defends the notion of authority as 
justifiable. (Remember that authority is power that has been successfully legitimated.) Where, for 
example, an individual demonstrates superior skill and expertise, says Gadamer, there is a good 
reason for according her authoritative status. But such skill needs to be continually tested and 
affirmed. 
11 By calling one negative and other positive power, I do not mean to imply any judgment of the 











There are a number of ways of responding to this critique. The first is to say that one cannot deal 
with power without hermeneutics. How would one know that it was power unless it had first been 
interpreted as such? In short, the hermeneutics of power necessarily precedes any critical 
analysis of power. A close corollary to this interpretative premise is the principle that the effects of 
power are always subject to interpretation. There can be no easy assumption that power will 
achieve what it intends, what Thompson calls the internalist fallacy (Thompson, 1990: 24) This 
principle is amply born out by my own case~studies where the outcomes of teaching can only be 
said to be wildly unpredictable. 
A second response is to say that a narrow focus on power excludes a wide range of other social 
phenomena. Critical theory is brought to a premature closure in its analysis of social reality. 
Hermeneutics can and does deal with power, but it also goes way beyond power. 
A third response is to say that, in practice, Gadamer is very often more radical in his 
deconstruction of social aspects than critical theory. In effect, he shows that critical theory, even 
in its Habermasian form, retains residues of positivism, and the will to power that goes with that 
(How, 1995). In other words, critical theory commits a performative fallacy in 'speaking truth to 
power' but on the premise of unequal power. Critical theory cannot be critical without assuming 
that critical theorists have more to say than people on the street. As de Certeau comments on 
Foucault in this regard: 
Who is he to know what no one else knows, what so many thinkers have 'forgotten' or 
have yet to realize about their own thought? He acts as though he were omnipresent 
(since all heteronomies of history constitute the only account his thought will relate), but 
he is absent (since he has designated his own place nowhere in that history). (quoted in 
McNay, 1994:82) 
Critical theorists cannot speak without assuming a superior right to speak. They work from the 
assumption that their use of power is positive and that it leads to emancipation. 
Positive Power 
Now, these responses to the critiques around power might perform an effective hatchet job on 
critical theory's critique. But this response ignores the alternative notion of power as positive. 
Power can be seen as positive in two different ways. One is ontological. In this sense, power is 











What he means is that agency is not possible without the use of power, hence the notion of 
transformative capacity. All people have the capacity 'to make a difference' in the ordinary run of 
things, merely by being present in social situations, even being slaves (Giddens, 1984). 
But there is another notion of positive power which has more fruitful and productive outcomes, 
and it is strategic rather than ontological (Angen, 2001). There are hints of this notion of power in 
Gadamer's discussion of games. Players submit themselves to the rules of the game, says 
Gadamer. They are swept up by the contest, by the deliberately unpredictable contest, and find 
themselves changed by it. In this sense, submission to power differential is transformative and 
creative. 
Consider the example of traditional adolescent rites of passage. Let us assume a typical 
traditional process whereby an adolescent boy is brought to manhood. Conventionally, such 
processes go through three stages. In the first, a young boy is separated from his mother in 
frightening circumstances. Masked men, intending to terrify, tear the child from his (complicit) 
mother's arms. He is stripped of his clothes and possessions. In the second, liminal stage, the 
boy, frequently without clothes, must endure physical hardship. He is required to display courage 
and tenacity. At the same time, he is instructed in the principles of manhood. In the third and final 
stage, he is reintegrated into the social structure with a new status, a transformed identity, new 
clothes. He has become a man (van Gennep, 1960). 
There are a number of points to note here. First, this is not an ontological analysis. The outcome 
of this chronological process is not necessarily beneficial. It depends on the way that it is used. 
There are productive rites of passage, and there are destructive ones. Practitioners need to learn 
how to use their instruments of power, just as medical doctors or psychotherapists do. 
Second, the effect of such power is dependent on its acceptance and legitimation. If such power 
were to be deconstructed it would lose its beneficial effect. Xmas loses some of its allure when 
Santa Clause is revealed is nothing more than Dad with a funny hat. The most difficult client in 
psychotherapy is the one who knows too much psychology. The rite of passage would not be as 
effective if the initiate knew the (safe) outcome and the identity of the players. Against critical 
theory, the condition for power to operate here is that it remain veiled. 
How then does positive power operate in a pedagogic context? In the interviews discussed below 
I show how students respond, are swept up and transformed, have 'aha'-experiences, find the 
world around them responding all of a sudden in quite different ways. One (married) student says, 











completely different woman". Another says, "(The course) pressed all the buttons, whereas if I 
wasn't doing the course, I wouldn't have felt a thing". A third says "It throws your whole brain out." 
These are responses to the exercise of power across a range of pedagogic sites. Teachers 
exercise their power in designing curricula and constructing a chain of curriculum content, in 
formulating and marking assignments, in the shape and content of tutorial group discussions, and 
in the performance of lectures. They construct an itinerary analogous to a rite of passage which 
has fruitful outcomes. 
Researchers perform in a parallel world of power, in the choice, design and administering of 
research instruments. In our particular case, it is a matter of the composition and conduct of focus 
groups and more particularly, the process of questioning. The role of the facilitator is a critical part 
of the focus group procedure. The facilitator is in large part the medium through which positive 
power plays itself out. The facilitator is of course not an autonomous agent. He/she operates 
within the framework already set by the genre of tutorial discussion groups which universities 
embody. In addition, as we have seen, each group has its own history and experience of the 
course which colours focus group discussions. Yet, even within that framework with all its built-in 
protocols, practices, rewards and sanctions, the facilitator is a key part of the circumstance to 
which focus group participants respond. It is important therefore to investigate in some detail the 
role which facilitators play. 
In these focus group discussions, with two different facilitators, the interventions which facilitators 
made varied across a range. They looked like this: 
1. IntrodUCing the process, and introducing participants to each other; 
2. Keeping in touch: facilitators nod, they say "ja" or "OK", they maintain a light touch of 
control over the discussion, to show understanding or empathy; this is a very frequent, 
almost background participation, creating a supportive frame for the discussion; 
3. Active empathizing: facilitators echo the sentiment in an intervention, "that's brilliant!", 
"that was quite intense!", "Shoo! That's terrible!"; 
4. Reflecting back: this is done often in the form of a summarizing question, "What you're 
saying is .. ?", and participants will respond, "Mm, that's right"; 
This reflecting and summarizing happens at times in the form of chained questions: 
Facilitator: OK, so you're making connections? 
Student: Mm 
F: You're making sense? 
S: Ja, sometimes 












5. Probing, looking for further detail: .... what's behind that?", .... can you put your finger on 
it?", " ... what does that mean?", "can you give me an example?", "OK, I'm interested in 
that. What happens when ... 7". 
6. Clarification: "What does that mean?", "Which year are you talking about now?" 
7. Changing direction, a facilitator moving down the scheduled list of topics: " ... Are lectures 
a waste of time?" 
8. Persona' opinion: .. , mean, to be blunt ... you're a privileged group .. if you weren't 
enjoying what you're doing here, then there would be something wrong"; 
9. Disagreeing with partiCipants, "No, that's not true ... do you think that's entirely true? ... 
No, it's not that"; or self-revelation: " you know, when I did First Year History and I wasn't 
young either, but I had never done any (essays) ..... 
10. Debriefing: "Have you felt comfortable with this experience?" 
Looking down this list, it is quite evident that facilitators can exercise (negative) control over the 
process in any number of ways. They can change direction to avoid particular topics, suppress 
others. Control can be clothed and disguised in any of the above forms. On the other hand, 
positive power is best pursued in the form of the 'unconditional positive regard' characteristic of 
Rogerian psychotherapy. On the basis of that prinCiple, the facilitator's most productive and 
fruitful role is one of creating a safe environment (by for example explaining the aims of the 
process, and the principles of confidentiality and anonymity), reflecting back, summarizing, 
empathizing, probing, encouraging, staying in touch and debriefing. Thus can positive power be 
exercised. The facilitator aborts that process and exercises (negative) control when she 
disagrees, presents personal opinion, loses track of where the discussion is going, does not allow 
time or space for elaboration and detail, or at worst takes over the conversation. 
Educating or Corrupting the Youth? teachers and charlatans 
I n the previous section I have argued that teachers and social scientists have the power to do 
good. In this sense power must be embraced. At the same time, one must ask how teachers 
become sensitive to the dangers of abuse. As I have indicated, critical theorists, in their exposure 
of the hiding places of power, excuse themselves from critical analysis. But that is not good 
enough. How does one then go about a moral embracing of power? 
In 399 BC Socrates was condemned to death by an Athenian court for 'corrupting the youth, and 
of not acknowledging the gods the City acknowledges, but other new divinities' (Allen, 1984:86). It 











they were prepared to put someone to death in pursuit of this cause. The question which arises 
here is, is it not proper that we should be concerned about the kind of values, the gods, which our 
youth are being taught? 
In our present circumstances the accusation against Socrates speaks to the pressure on 
teachers and lecturers to catch the attention of learners and students in competition with 
television shows, films, advertisements and shopping malls, to improve their course evaluation 
ratings. There is rising pressure on academics to become more acquainted with the marketplace, 
to make their research available for 'useful' government policy, or for private sector activities. 
There are powerful temptations for lecturers to become showmen, dedicated to nothing more 
than course evaluation ratings, i.e. to an abuse of their positions of power. 
Now, this pressure is not without value. There is something to be said for the ivory tower meeting 
the market place, for the pure meeting the mongrel, for the ascetic meeting the charlatan, for 
principle to be applied in practice. The mix has a robust and hybrid-vigour feel about it. If 
academic ideas are worth anything then they should be able to be 'sold' like any other product. In 
short. there are powerful temptations and not invalid reasons in the teaching environment to 
seduce 'impressionable minds', to play to the audience, to play the game as well as the 
competitors play it, to don the robes of the charlatan (Guggenbuhl-Craig, 1971: 17). And, as we 
have seen, Plato was not insensitive to the value of playing the game in order to transcend it. 
But playing the game to what end? How to transcend it? Selling ideas in the market-place can 
become nothing more than quackery if it contains no transcendent motive. For Gadamer that 
motive is self-transformation for both students and teachers. This is not the place to investigate 
the crucial area of transformation among teachers and lecturers. That would take another 
dissertation. But it is important, for Gadamer, that teachers move beyond both the positivist and 
critical theory notions that ideology can somehow be shrugged off, or exorcised. For power to be 
morally exercised teachers need to recognize and acknowledge its temptations. They need 
themselves to empathize with those who abuse power (Guggenbuhl-Craig, 1971). 
But even if (the psychotherapist or lecturer) partly attains genuine consciousness, he 
cannot avoid a deepening of the shadows in his own unconscious. And within this 
darkness function the dark brothers of the priest and the doctor, to whom the therapist is 











Chapter 3: Research Methodology: Ethnography and Focus Groups 
We have so far considered three forms of questioning: the ontological, the prescriptive and that 
deriving from the Socratic dialectical method. Here I want to look at a fourth dimension to asking 
questions. This concerns the way in which researchers ask questions of the world around them, 
that is, the process of research. Traditional positivism thought that objective and impartial 
researchers could ask questions of an independent and autonomous empirical reality. The 
criterion of reliability meant that other researchers could ask the same questions and get the 
same answers. For grounded theory, the principle of saturation, for example, means that if 
researchers ask the same question of a sample of people often enough, the independence of 
empirical reality means that the answers will start repeating themselves eventually. 
For hermeneutics subject and object in research are irrevocably bound. They influence each 
other continuously. Asking questions itself changes reality. One should not then expect the 
answers to repeat themselves. 
In this chapter I elaborate on and justify the use of ethnography and focus groups as research 
instruments in a hermeneutic project. I argue that particular instruments are not tied to anyone 
theory. I show how focus groups have moved from being adjuncts to positivist research, to a 
position where they are now seen as sources of very detailed qualitative data. I also investigate a 
number of problems arising from the use of focus groups, one being their group-context, and the 
second being their neglect of the macro-perspective. 
There is a strong narrative in the social sciences which depicts a historical process of growth from 
adolescent submission to the authority of the natural sciences to a more self-assured assertion of 
their own identity (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). That image of the move to adulthood in the social 
sciences is visible also in the history of research methodology. In an earlier time of tentative 
uncertainty the social sciences obeyed the positivist instructions to reliability, validity, 
generalizability and impartiality. While postpositivist methodologies like grounded theory still 
aspire to these basic criteria, at least in some attenuated form, they have gradually been 
abandoned by critical theory and hermeneutic positions. 
As I have indicated earlier, my understanding of hermeneutics is not relativist in the same sense 
that constructivism is. It is not the case that any position is equivalent to any other. There are still 
criteria for judging the value of an interpretation which transcend particular positions 12. In addition, 
12 Schwandt notes that even postmodernist constructivists do not abandon criteria for judging the 











for Gadamer the function of interpretation is transformative through the process of investigating 
prejudice and tradition. That means that it goes beyond the building of 'more informed and more 
sophisticated reconstructions' (Guba & Lincoln. 1994: 112). For Gadamer. the construction of 
more elaborate and sophisticated narratives is a means for taking the further step of 
encountering. and being reconciled with, the alien. 
Flowing from the anti-positivist position is the further principle that particular research methods 
have no theory embedded in them. Almost any research technique can be used for either 
quantitative or qualitative ends (Giddens. 1984). That quintessence of positivism, statistics, can 
quite comfortably be used for qualitative ends. And conversely, face-to-face interviewing can be 
used for hard science ends, as in grounded theory. In this study, then, I have used materials and 
techniques of very different kinds to serve a hermeneutic purpose. The basic techniques used in 
this research are ethnography, and focus groups (although one could argue that focus groups is 
simply a subset of ethnography). 
Ethnography 
Let us consider each of these briefly. Ethnography has it's roots in social anthropology and was 
spread most famously and most eloquently by Clifford Geertz. It has however long since broken 
out of its anthropological foundations and become an accepted part of many social sciences. In 
its common-or-garden format it denotes a style of research characterized by (1) naturalism - that 
is, it examines social behaviour in the real rather than the laboratory world; (2) participant 
observation - it is conducted by researchers who spend considerable time in the everyday lives 
of their informants, (3) understanding - it breaks away from positivist research methods and is 
committed to the qualitative; and (4) discovery- it is guided by the research questions which 
arise from particular situations rather than sticking rigidly to particular preset hypotheses 
(Hammersley, 1994, Kumaravadivelu. 1999). Many ethnographers would add that good 
ethnography is 'thick description'. For Denzin, think description 'gives the context of the 
experience, and reveals the experience as a process' (Denzin, 1994:505). 
Ethnography has come in for considerable critique on the grounds that it is politically quiescent 
and colludes with the (colonial) oppressor by not taking a clear stand on issues of power (much 
like hermeneutics does) (Ortner, 1999; Clifford, 2001). In a sense this is an unfair critique. 
Ethnography sets itself the quite different task of understanding, of standing in the shoes of, 
different cultures, of expanding our understanding of others and other cultures. This has value in 
research being 'incomplete, simplistiC, uninformed, internally inconsistent or derived by 











its own right. One could just as well critique critical theory for neglecting cross-cultural tolerance 
in the name of social justice. 
Does this study then constitute ethnography? First. yes. it is participant observation. These 
students and I spent nine weeks together engaged in the minutiae of a university course. 
interacting in the various ways required by academic situations. I planned the course. I lectured, 
tutored. discussed; they listened. took notes, wrote assignments, asked questions, discussed, 
consulted. We were all engaged in an ongoing project. 
Second, it was indeed a quite natural situation. We were all engaged in the standard and routine 
activity that happens in tertiary educational institutions. It is in the nature of 'data-collection', 
however, that it disrupts such everyday 'natural' activity. Research is never (except perhaps in the 
reading of printed texts) a simple process of distant observation, especially not when it is 
participant. But that is what ethnographers mean when they say a situation is 'natural'. 
Third, the aim of the research is, via a range of methods, to probe into, to elaborate the meanings 
behind, the views and opinions given by students. It is quintessentially an attempt at 
understanding (of a particular kind) rather than explanation. 
Fourth, as I have indicated, I did start out with a set of questions to ask, my research agenda, but, 
unsurprisingly, new facets appeared which drove me in new directions. It is part of the 
ethnographic agenda that there is no fixed agenda. that the focus of the research is strongly 
influenced by the informant and by the information. 
This research is, fifthly, participant in another sense, that the information gathered here is fed 
back into the ongoing process of teaching, what some might have called participant action 
research - but that inserts a critical theory component which I would not want to pursue too far. 
Focus Groups 
Focus groups are a technique for interviewing groups of 6-10 people about a particular topic or 
focus. The discussions are initiated and often directed by a moderator or facilitator13 who may 
then either lead the discussion or observe from outside the group. At times facilitators use an 
image or film clip or a text to start the discussion. 












The history of focus groups recapitulates the history of the social sCiences, in general, and 
research methods, in particular, that is, moving out from under the shadow of the natural 
sciences. Focus groups as a research technique migrated across to the social sciences from 
marketing and communications research in the 1950's (Lunt and Livingstone, 1996). As first used 
by Robert Merton, focus groups were seen as a subsidiary adjunct to survey research. Focus 
groups were a source of new ideas for questionnaire items or the first site of testing out an 
embryonic hypothesis. Public opinion was seen as focus groups writ large. Over time, however, 
focus groups have come to be seen as an important source of information in their own right. 
Indeed, Morgan & Spanish (Morgan and Spanish, 1984) argue that focus groups combine the 
advantages of personal interviews (giving indepth information) and participant observation 
(arising from a naturalistic situation). 
It is the group aspect of the focus group technique which has drawn considerable attention. For 
theorists sensitive to the imbalances of power in social research, the group context provides a 
way to lessen the dominance of the interviewer! researcher (Lunt and Livingstone, 1996, Strebel, 
1994, Wilkinson. 1998). Participants can within a supportive environment broach sensitive and 
potentially embarrassing ideas. Focus groups provide a way to empower participants. Focus 
groups have been used to start up support groups for vulnerable individuals. Strebel used her 
groups to distribute information around AIDS and condoms (Strebel, 1994). She found also that 
participants were able to air quite intimate problems and find solutions from the group. In my own 
research, student participants often found such discussions extremely helpful in sharing and 
reflecting on problems. 
From another angle the group can be seen as a site of social interaction. That is important for a 
number of reasons. For Vygotskians, knowledge is mediated by society. The group context does 
not contaminate individual views, as the positivists liked to think. It is itself the source of social 
knowledge (Lunt and Livingstone, 1996). For symbolic interactionists, on the other hand, 
partiCipants in a pre-existing group operate in a naturalistic context. They wilt exhibit here 
distinctive language and behaviour. at times as part of a separate subculture. In this context 
participants will initiate ideas, challenge other partiCipants' ideas, call for detailed justification in 
ways that are impossible in an individual interview. Focus groups have the potential to deliver 
material of a very high quality. 
It is of course not the case, as Wilkinson claims, that individual interviews are free of social 
context (Wilkinson, 1998). "The difference between group and individual interviews is not one that 
contrasts social with psychological frameworks of theoretical interpretation, but one that 











Livingstone, 1996). Nor is it the case, as Robert Merton was wont to think, that focus groups are a 
small sample of a wider, constant, uniform public opinion. In more recent theory, public opinion is 
rather seen as multivocal, fragmented, context-bound and continually shifting. There is in fact 
considerable doubt that one can speak at all of 'public opinion' (Lunt and Livingstone, 1996). It is 
public opinion which is the epiphenomenon, not the group. 
The focus groups in this study occurred within the broader circumstance of a university. That 
situation has one profound impact on the experience of focus groups, namely that all participants 
are very familiar with tutorial group discussions. Focus groups in this study have a very close 
relationship to this particular group genre. Participants in these focus groups were drawn from 
pre-existing tutorial groups, many of them run by myself. Within these groups there are set 
routines, protocols, practices, power relationships, and all of these are carried over almost 
seamlessly into the focus group. Students often remarked during the post-focus group debriefing 
that "this is how tutorial groups ought to be". 
There were of course interesting differences with a pure tutorial group session. For a start, 
students were not required to prepare anything for the focus group. This was 'free' discussion. 
Second, they sat in armchairs around a small coffee table with drinks and snacks at hand. It was 
then more relaxed than a tutorial group. Third, it was much smaller than a normal tutorial group. 
Focus groups here were typically five or six students, compared to the 25 or 26 in tutorial groups. 
There was much more opportunity for each individual to participate. 
The familiarity that students might have felt with the focus group context has advantages and 
disadvantages. It is helpful in that participants can feel relaxed. This is a place they have been 
before, they know the people, they know the routine, nothing surprising. On the other hand, it 
would make it quite difficult to do things differently, to break out of that set mould, particularly to 
change the structures of power. Tutorial groups, after all, are embedded in an academic structure 
with very severe sanctions against misbehaviour or failure and great rewards for success. The 
stakes are high. At the same time, as I have indicated earlier, the authority of academic staff in a 
social science is contradictory, in that it is built on the systematic critique of authority. What I am 
suggesting is that focus groups within an academic environment carry a very particular and quite 
complex set of associations. freedoms and compulsions. 
The group context of focus groups is substantially affected by the role of the facilitator. As I have 
discussed earlier. research techniques do not belong inherently to any theory. By the same token 
focus groups can be used for very different purposes, either positivist. as Merton did in the 











researcher to shape this instrument to her own purposes. This applies particularly to the role of 
the facilitator. So, for instance, a researcher interested in the detail of a specific subculture would 
probably remain substantially in the background, listening for the spontaneous appearance of 
topics, or the language used in discussing them. Critical theorists of a feminist bent would be 
looking and probing for hidden power positions, and would downplay the dominance of the 
facilitator. 
From a hermeneutic perspective, by contrast, and given the particular take on generative power 
in this study, the facilitator might be much more active in structuring the conversation, in probing 
beyond the surface level of everyday talk, eliciting personal experiences, looking for meaningful, 
intense experiences. Facilitator techniques would be drawn from therapeutic situations. They 
would summarize, reflect back, encourage and nurture participant responses. They will also, as I 
have said, draw quite substantially from the practices set up in pre-existing tutorial groups. 
Discussions in this environment will tend to centre around the facilitator. She will hold the reins of 
the discussion, however lightly. Much of the dialogue will be with her rather than with other 
participants in the group. Participants might also frequently look for approval. They are all talking 
to someone who has the power in a not too distant context to assess them. The role of one 
facilitator (in this study) who was not an academic then also becomes an interesting one. 
The positivist voice in focus groups, though relativized, has however not been completely 
silenced. That voice still questions the scientific rigour, and the reliability of focus group 
information, as well as the problematic possibility of the group pushing participants towards false 
consensus, or conversely towards an equally false polarity. This positivist voice is indeed not 
limited to focus group techniques alone. It is part of a much wider debate between quantitative 
and qualitative research. between positivists. critical theorists and hermeneutics, which cannot be 
fully discussed here. In broad terms, the responses from qualitative research have been of two 
kinds (Lunt & Livingstone). One stream has attempted to replicate positivist 'rigour' in some form 
in the qualitative arena. This can be most clearly seen in grounded theory and. for example. their 
principle of theoretical saturation. That entails repeating the focus groups sessions until the topics 
broached in discussion start repeating themselves. Others in this first stream work with residual 
realist notions like triangulation (Angen, 2000). 
The second stream has abandoned a correspondence theory of epistemology and accepted that 
there can be no clear separation of observing subject and observed object in the social world. In 
this line. writers like Guba & Lincoln work with notions of authenticity: ontological authenticity 
which 'enlarges personal constructions'; and educative authenticity which aims at 'improved 











There are two dilemmas for researchers that I want to look at arising out of focus groups. One 
concerns the importance of the group context of social interaction. The dilemma here is, in very 
practical terms, one of where context starts and stops. Given the influence of context it is in 
principle inappropriate to pull quotes from a group interview to illustrate, let us say, a particular 
reaction to sociology teaching. The point is that (1) a three-line quote is often part of (2) a longer 
(page-long), more rambling explanation with several interjections by other participants or the 
facilitator, which is itself then said in response to (3) another participant's contribution on a 
particular issue, which comes as a response to (4) the facilitator's intervention! prompting (3 
pages previously). And so one could go on. 
To some degree the particular area of focus is determined by the theoretical framework. In the 
hermeneutic-psychological framework I have chosen for this study, the focus hones in on the 
individual and situational. and brackets out temporarily the broader marcro-issues which 
something like discourse analysis might have pointed to. I am well aware then that my analysis 
makes very little mention of the South African political or the post-modern globalizing context, or 
even the managerialist discourse that higher education is presently caught up in. 
This bias towards the micro is accentuated by the nature of Gadamer's philosophy. For Gadamer 
addresses primarily the position of the individual and individual meaning. It is true that he makes 
much of the influence of tradition and prejudice on the individual, and these are both inherently 
social factors. But his point of departure is the individual and the individual's process of 
transformation in meeting with the alien. It is not surprising then that there are then close parallels 
between Gadamer's hermeneutics and (Jungian) psychology. They complement and overlap with 
each other very neatly. But that puts hermeneutics at odds with, for example, critical theory and 
the discourse analysis deriving from it, which both attempt to link, the individual to broader 
societal issues. While not denying the structural perspective, I have followed Giddens's principle 
of 'bracketing out' the macro while analyzing the micro (Giddens, 1984). 
In my analysis of responses from focus groups I have consolidated the contributions of (six) 
particular individuals. In other words, I have collected together a range of responses from a 
particular individual from across the group conversation in an effort to show combinations, 
contradictions, developments and transformations. In strict contextual terms, this is inappropriate. 
The responses of each of these individuals could have been evaluated with the broader group 












At the same time, with other participants' contributions edited out, this mode of analysis gives an 
illusion of great emotional intensity in the discussion, almost as if it had been a face-to-face 
interview. This effect is a hint that face-to-face interviews might have been a more appropriate 
mode of data-gathering. 
Methodological problems 
All research is flawed in one way or another. It is an attempt, as I have indicated, to stitch 
together fragments of an incomplete narrative. In this study, three problems stood out. The first 
concerns the choice of focus group participants. I have said that the course evaluations during 
2004 (in September and November) produced a number of extremely intriguing and quite 
enthusiastic responses. Many felt that the course had been 'an eye-opener'. I was interested in 
finding out what the term, eye-opener, meant. But here was a dilemma. Course evaluations were 
anonymous and confidential. If I was to pursue the meanings and stories behind the word, eye-
opener, I would have to identify those individuals who wrote it. But I was debarred from doing this 
by the ethics of the case. In the end, focus groups participants were chosen from two tutorial 
groups, one run by myself, and one by a senior tutor. I simply invited students in these two 
groups to be participants. It was, in short, a wildly random selection. I had no guarantee 
beforehand that the participants had found the course an eye-opener, or even if they were 
particularly positive about it. In the event, a number of students had had extremely intense 
experiences which they were prepared to talk about. 
The second problem was a technical one. The tape-recorders which I used produced recordings 
with a high level of static noise which made people's voices extremely difficult to hear. Large 
swathes of conversation were Simply indecipherable. This I tried to remedy by trying out a 
number of different tape-recorders, sometimes with conference microphones attached. There was 
some improvement, but not a great deal. Certain voices were persistently inaudible (and, 
bizarrely, most of these were African ones) or unidentifiable. For a research instrument like the 
focus group which makes much of the group context of conversation, missing out on the voice of 
one of two partiCipants can seriously undermine one's understanding of what preceded and what 
followed particular contributions. From this perspective the concentrated focus on one particular 
(clearly identifiable) individual's contributions works to counteract this technological 
fragmentation. 
The third methodological problem derives from a theoretical problem. I spent a lot of time 
searching for a mode of data analysis which served my purposes. At a fairly late stage I 











purposes extremely well, his elaboration of specific methods of confronting stereotypes is quite 
elementary. There were very few detailed and practical guidelines. In my data-analysis, then, I 
have needed to feel my way along. 
As a start I was helped by John Thompson's elaboration of a methodology for a depth 
hermeneutics of mass communication, drawing as he does on the writings of Ricoeur and 
Gadamer (Thompson, 1990: 272ff). Thompson proposes that a comprehensive methodology of 
interpretation should include three aspects: (1) social-historical analysis; (2) formal or structural 
analysis; and (3) interpretation and re-interpretation 14. Social-structural analysis investigates the 
givens and regularities of the social structures within which the interpretative activity takes place. 
This includes, says Thompson, spatia-temporal settings, fields of interaction, social institutions, 
and social structure. In my study I have concentrated more on the immediate situational aspects 
than the broader structural ones. Thus I have explained the historical runup to the 2004 first year 
sociology course in Chapter One; the details of the taught curriculum and course content 
elaborated in Chapter Two in the section, 'First Year Sociology's Agenda'; and the circumstances 
of the focus group interviews, their resemblance to tutorial groups and the importance of the 
group context, in Chapter Three under the heading, 'Focus Groups'. I have not examined, for 
example, the broader managerialist transformation of universities, or global pressures towards 
post-fordism. 
In Thompson's schema, the second element, formal or structural analysiS refers to the method of 
data analysis. This may take on any number of forms, from semiotic analysis through 
conversation analysis to narrative analysis. This stage of Thompson's schema corresponds to my 
own use of the concepts of the alien and various forms of Othering. Let us consider this in further 
detail here. 
I started with identifying the indicators for these various notions of alien and Othering in the 
transcripts, what I have called 'points of energy', i.e. where my interviewees have used 
expressions like 'disgusted', 'depravity', 'shocked', 'amazing', 'I was excited', 'I cried', 
'passionate', 'crisis' and so on. These could be both negative (like disgust) and positive (like awe 
and respect). From here it was a matter of selecting the appropriate form of Freudian or Fanonian 
Other, or Gadamer's alien. 
14 These aspects he applies to the three phases of mass communication, namely production, 
transmission and reception. While I have not done this in my study, it would be extremely 
interesting to apply the phases of production, transmission and reception to the process of 











From there I looked for the discursive framework which bound the various elements together. 
Sometimes this appeared as a political ideology. Here it was important to investigate the power 
position of the experience. Was it from a position of being powerful, or from one of being 
powerless? For one participant it was her battle against a more powerful apartheid system and its 
racist heritage that energized her. This had a subordinate class and politically radical framework. 
For another it was an encompassing religious approach, with some resemblance to a liberal 
ideology but from a suffering/victim perspective. For yet another it was a discourse of human 
rights. 
A third step was to look for signs of movement in individual attitudes as indications of 
transformation. One woman said that she had experienced 'an identity crisis'. Another had gained 
confidence, found a particular identity and left another one behind. Important in these shifts was 
their function. Meeting the alien is an acknowledgement of a mistake, of having operated under a 
misconception, of having learned something significantly new. It is often a humbling process. 
Encountering or experiencing (as opposed to meeting) the Other, by contrast, engenders strong 
emotions like disgust and awe. Re-integrating a projection (which is in a strict sense what 
meeting the Other is) is the dramatic popping of an emotional bubble, like the Pauline conversion. 
Unburdening oneself of long-held emotional experiences, on the other hand, produces a powerful 
cathartic effect, a release of tension (Samuels et aI., 1986:18). 
An important question here then was what the person was doing with the Other or the alien. Were 
they simply feeling the energy of the Other (experiencing feelings of disgust and outrage)? Were 
they fighting the Other (as in Fanon's case of the fighting culture)? Were they actually 'meeting' 
the Other in the sense of recognizing those temptations in themselves (the real case of empathy), 
or developing a certain understanding or 'fondness' (the case of sympathy)? 
Finally, there was the question as to the metaphors which shaped the Other and the alien, which 
constituted their essence. Metaphors are themselves often points of energy which also point to 
background associations. For one participant criminals who committed crimes of violence 
suffered from a 'mental imbalance', an image of crime as insanity. For another, among prisoners 
who participated in male rape there was 'depravity'. 
Let us now turn to Thompson's third aspect of depth hermeneutic analysis, namely interpretation 
and re-interpretation. Thompson here emphasizes the principle that interpretation in the social 
sciences, unlike the natural sciences, deals with a pre-interpreted phenomenon. The objects of 
research already have their own interpretation of what they are on about. Social researchers then 











Social researchers, then, are first considering what particular individuals make of the various 
structures (of alien and Other), and are then going a step further in attributing meanings which 
those individuals might not be conscious of. This sets up a possibility, says Thompson, of a 
conflict of interpretations and the possibility of intervention - which happens when researchers 
relay their interpretations back to their interviewees. 
For Thompson, then, researchers stick their necks out in making an interpretation of a pre-
interpreted text. They need to support those interpretations with evidence and argument. In some 
cases researchers go back to the original interviewees to check whether their interpretations 'ring 
bells'. In others they conduct more than one interview with each group or individual in order to 
build up further background context. In all of my case-studies, there was only one interview, and I 
had not (yet) taken the material back for validation. 
Research Ethics 
In this section I want to address two issues. The first concerns the conventional ethics issues in 
research of confidentiality, anonymity and transparency. The second concerns the issue of the 
validation of qualitative research. In a post-positivist environment, validation is no longer a matter 
of checking data against an independent reality, but often more one of trust and good faith Le. 
again a matter of ethics. 
Let us consider the first set of issues concerning confidentiality, anonymity and transparency in 
relationships with the participants in this project. These were, as I have indicated, groups of 
students from the sociology first year course who participated in focus group discussions. In each 
case at the commencement of the focus group discussion, students were given a detailed 
explanation of what the research project was about, and how they fitted into it. They were given 
the option of leaving the group at any time. Following this, they were assured that their names 
would not be mentioned in the research report, and that if material from their group was used in a 
public document, they would have access to both the transcripts of the discussion, and to the final 
material before publication. They were then informed of their conditions of employment Le. the 
fact they would be paid, and how long the 'employment' would last. Finally, in a debriefing at the 
end of each seSSion, they were asked to reflect on their experience of being in the group. 
These various interactions passed without problems. No students left the group, and during the 
debriefing many felt that the discussion had been very worthwhile. One said, "This is what all 











The second issue of validation concerns the demise of positivist criteria for qualitative research. 
For it has become clear that positivist criteria of reliability and validity rely on the separation of 
subject and object in research. Put differently, positivist criteria posited the autonomous existence 
of objects of research such that different researchers could, independently of each other, observe 
the same phenomenon and come to the same conclusions. It was then in principle possible for 
one researcher to check on, or validate, the results produced by another. 
In the social sciences, and particularly in qualitative research, this position has been seen to be 
untenable, for the reason that observers cannot extract themselves from the situation being 
observed. Observers are integrally part of the situation that they are observing. In this case there 
is no longer any foundation for reliability i.e. the repeatability of research results, or for validity i.e. 
checks on the accuracy of observation. Nor for that matter, for the third positivist criterion of 
generalizability, for this criterion relies for its feasibility on replicability. 
If these criteria for empirical verification are no longer possible, what criteria remain for qualitative 
research? Well, it depends a great deal on which tradition of research one is dealing with. There 
are still remnants of positivist criteria to be found in qualitative research in such principles as 
triangulation, constant comparative method, collegial audit. and theoretical saturation especially 
within grounded theory (Huberman & Miles 1994; Angen, 2000; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
However, any claims to correspondence with an independent reality have been abandoned by 
both critical theory and hermeneutics. For critical theory, with its commitment to political 
intervention, writers speak of catalytiC authentiCity (research that stimulates action), and tactical 
authentiCity (research that empowers its objects of research). Hermeneutic writers for their part, 
speak of ontological authenticity (research which 'enlarges personal constructions), and 
educative authenticity (research which improves our understanding of others) (Guba & Lincoln, 
1994). Angen considers that research must be beneficial to its objects, generative of new ideas 
(she calls it 'voluptuous validity'), transformative and transgressive (this last sounds reminiscent 
of critical theory). In addition, it must be 'thick' description, i.e. it must exhibit an intimate 
knowledge of the situation and of the objects of research, and exhibit verisimilitude. Finally, she 
says, researchers must be 'resilient, patient. persistent, meticulous, passionate, and personally 
involved' (Angen, 2000). 
Coming from a hermeneutic perspective, I have pursued the goals of ontological and educative 
authenticity, voluptuous validity, transformation and thick description. Whether I can at the same 
time be 'resilient, patient, persistent, meticulous, passionate, and personally involved' is difficult to 






















Chapter 4 Focus Group Interviews and Course Evaluations 
As I have indicated, there were two sets of focus group interviews, and two course evaluations 
from which I drew my data. The focus groups split between those held in November of 2003 
(which is the first case that I will investigate), and those held in November of 2004. The course 
evaluations were held in September and November of 2004 respectively. The September 2004 
evaluation was quite cryptic for our purposes, but provided the first hints of something interesting 
happening. I do not report on those responses here. The November evaluation, however, was 
much more detailed, and I do provide a categorization of these responses below. The sequence 
of the discussion below then follows the strict chronology as they happened: 
1. The November 2003 focus group interviews - from which I extracted one interview called 
Katherine 
2. The November 2004 course evaluation questionnaire - which I have categorized 
according to the concepts of debunking, relativizing and system-relating 
3. The November 2004 focus group interviews - from which I extracted five individuals -
Jennifer, Nina, Linda, Karen and Roland. 
Let us start with the first focus group interview. 
The 2003 Interviews 
There were in the 2003 groups, as I have indicated earlier, two discussions here, both with the 
same group of students. The groups were run at the end of a troubled SOC1 05 semester course 
in November 2003. Students in the course had complained that they could not understand what 
the lecturer was talking about; that there was no connection between the case-study on 
affirmative action and the theoretical concepts being proposed; that the lecturer was suppressing 
discussion in the class. 
Given this historical context, the two discussions have very different atmospheres. The first, 
facilitated by myself, is freer of the troubles of the course. I am not the source of the 'troubles', 
although very evidently. I have not been a great hit with the students either. The topic of 
discussion does not broach the problems of the course. Students can, therefore, be more 
relaxed. They can relate their positive experiences of school and of the university in a relatively 
free-flowing exchange. 
But the second discussion is more difficult. Students are confronted by the lecturer (Carmen) 











is wrong with sociology? What did I do wrong?". There are moments of considerable tension. At 
one stage, Carmen asks "Did you guys all attend lectures? Well, this is now getting to Johann's 
part ... ". She acknowledges that students found her lecturing difficult and that they might not have 
attended her lectures. So, she exempts herself from the question. 
At another quite charged point, a student says quite bluntly, in effect, that this person's lectures 
were incomprehensible: 
" ... most of us were sitting there going "What are you going on about?" and we were 
getting like, you know, "Should we even go to lectures?", you know, because we didn't 
know what was going on. " 
These two discussions then generate very different ranges of topics. The first elicits mostly 
positive experiences, and these from disciplines outside of sociology: social anthropology, social 
work, psychology, the foundation course (DOH). So, students talk about the value of the 
orientation week, of DOH tutorials, of writing essays for the first time, of receiving feedback 
comments on essays, and of some lecturers (in psychology). They marvel at the changes which 
have come over them, in their identities, in their way of looking at the world, and the difficulty of 
'not having definite right and wrong answers'. 
The second discussion draws mostly negative experiences, and most of these from sociology. 
The Sociology course lacked definition, there were too many pointless and indistinguishable 
theories, too much economics for a sociology course, the course didn't match the faculty 
handbook description or the orientation week introductions, there was too little class interaction, 
there were too few case-studies, mark allocation was too strict, essay topics were boring, it was 
difficult to connect theory and case studies, there was no connection with current news, 
assignment topics were vague and 'wishy-washy'. 
Katherine: an identity crisis on such a huge scale 
Ranging across both of these discussions is the input of an older social work woman student who 
has come back to university after 15 years, whom I shall call Katherine. She dominates the 
discussions in both groups, introducing new topics, setting the tone for each one. She is 
passionate, enthusiastic and idealistic, often hyperbolic. She goes through intense experiences in 
a number of different areas. There are interesting overlaps with Linda (below) who is also an 
older student with strong political views. What follows is a consolidation of Katherine's views 











She launches the group's discussion by praising the usefulness of the orientation week for new 
students, "I found it very helpful, because I would have been completely lasf'. In her previous 
entry into the university there was no such help "so J had something to compare it with", and this 
time it made 'a huge difference'. 
Katherine's most dramatic experience occurs through self-analysis in her social work course. She 
prepares the group for this. "Look, heaven forbid we leave university and we're still the same as 
when we entered'. But the result for her is quite emphatic: " .. I mean, its an identity crisis on such 
a huge scale"; " ... and it's been hard to take especially if you're married with three kids and 
suddenly your husband's married to a completely different woman". In her marriage it leads to 
conflict. "You know, the minute you have change you have conflicf'. She contrasts the social work 
course with 'the superficiality of things that are thrown to you in the world around you' because 
she was asked to 'dig so deep'. The process has a powerful emotional impact on her, "so J can 
spend a week crying, because suddenly going back to childhood memories I didn't want to go 
to ... ". "It's a hard thing ... a very hard thing to self-analyse and to then .. and to then and also to 
write it down in 20 pages and give it to a complete stranger to mark. 'OK, here's my life"'. 
What has happened to Katherine here is not altogether clear. She does not say how her attitudes 
have changed although she does indicate some of the effects of it on her marital and parental 
relationships. She is brought into conflict with her husband. She treats her children differently. 
What is a strong possibility is that, for the first time, she has spoken about emotional material 
which she has carried with her for a long time. Jungians speak about the cathartic effect of such 
unburdening. (Samuels, 1986) 
She also finds that she is in awe of intellectual brilliance. She admires a tutor in the DOH course: 
"I used to go home to my husband and say "I sit in the presence of greatness at futs or 
workshops"; she calls it "this academic cynicism". Later on she provides more detail on this 
aspect of cynicism. "its just really around a cynicism, maybe, of. of. of the face-value and the 
superficiality of things that are thrown at you in the world around you". 
Two things seem to be happening in this fragment. She has found a positive rather than negative 
Other. It is awe and respect rather than anger or disgust which drives her here. At the same time 
she finds her views pulled up short. She describes her earlier views as 'face-value' and 










She relates a story about another member of this tutorial group. "I walked out with a girl who was 
just never interested and she just looked at me and she said '/ wish he'd just shut his mouth, 
because I want to shop without a conscience and I don't want my world rocked'" (general 
laughter). Katherine defines herself by her critique of a student who just wants to shop. We shall 
see further on that this is a common theme among students who have experienced change. Later 
she again speaks critically of students who are so 'driven in getting to their course', 'there's this 
huge drive in terms of working exceptionally hard'. "And I will say Why aren't you finding 
something to protest about? Why aren't you bunking more? / mean, have some fun!' .. your time 
at university is the time to push the boundaries and to really protest, explore ... ". About her own 
time on campus "we didn't get to lectures half the time, because the security police were on 
campus ... " 
In Katherine's new identity this is the new Other, those students who just want to shop 
unperturbed, those who have no political conscience, those who are so career-stricken that they 
cannot have fun. We shall see further on that this is a recurring theme among students who have 
experienced change. 
In social anthropology she has a range of reading on cultural relativism around the topic of 
Islamic female circumcision: "At the end of (the reading), I suddenly thought to myself, 'Okay, who 
the hell do we think we are from the West?'" .. What will happen to a 15-year old girl who's about 
to be circumcised if you come in and stop it? What happens to her sense of identity of being a 
woman? ... and it shook me that I actually ended up saying 'Who the hell are we to go try and 
stop circumcision in Africa?". 
Katherine has experienced further change here. Her views on Islamic female circumcision have 
been pulled up short, and it 'shook' her, a second instance of her meeting the alien. She accuses 
'the West' of moral arrogance, and there is a moment of empathy with a young Muslim woman. 
'What happens to her sense of identity of being a woman?'. 
A final experience concerns moral outrage at the evil things that happen in the world: u .. the 
example of whichever basketball player, Michael Jordan, who got $30 million, more than 20 
million (people) of Indonesia ... and I was just "Do you realize what capitalists you've been and 
how the globalization is impacting on your life that you're so blind to .. ?"". Here then is an Other 












As an older student (like Linda below) Katherine experiences university life with enthusiasm and 
passion. She has strong responses in both positive and negative directions: she is in awe of 
intellectual brilliance, she scorns students who are politically passive, she is outraged at Michael 
Jordan's endorsements, she empathizes with young Muslim women. But there are contradictions 
here. In many ways, here views here, even though newly articulated on some topics, are a direct 
extension of her previous political activism. For one who protested against apartheid 15 years 
ago, it is not surprising to find her now critical of Michael Jordan or of Western cultural 
imperialism over Muslim culture, or of politically quiescent students. These are all familiar to a 
discourse of working class political consciousness. Her cathartic experience through self-analysis 
is however something different. Here she undergoes a very significant change - although difficult 
to pin down given the available information. 
The 2004 Interviews: Eye·openers and I-openers 
As I have indicated, the 2004 set of interviews takes place after a very different experience for 
students. In a nutshell, the course has been a 'success' because students have responded very 
positively to it. I have indicated earlier on quite briefly some of the responses that came through 
two course evaluations, one in September and one in November. The November responses were 
much more detailed and I provide below examples and a first categorization of these responses. I 
also show how these responses relate to the attributes of the sociological imagination: debunking, 
relativizing and system-relating. It is important to underline that these responses are not universal 
processes. They are cognitive and emotional developments linked to a particular historical and 
social context in which universities and their containing societies stand in a very specific 
relationship to each other. 
Social Embeddedness - the equivalent of system-relating, students come to realize the link 
between their individual lives and social structures, the way that 'big' society 'out there' enters into 
the interstices of their everyday existence. The category of Explanations below is the theorizing 
leg of system-relating, whereby disparate elements are now linked into broader systems of 
thinking, where social phenomena are seen to have causes and origins which differ from their 
'street' theorizations. 
1. "I have been tak(ing) (X) .. as things that does not affect me " as other people's 
responsibilities. I have now realized that I am part and parcel of everything that happens." 












3. "Affirmative Action. Well it didn't change my mind but I now know the reasoning so l! 
makes more sense." 
4. "Yes, because now I have some of the explanations on things that I did not have answers 
for"; 
5. n, •• rounded scientific insight into our everyday life's"; 
6. ", .. each section gave me deeper. more informed and intelligent view of society which 1 
found immeasurable useful." 
Independent Thinking - both this category and the following two, critical thinking and challenges, 
are key parts of debunking, In its critical theory form, this is a process of ideology critique, the 
way in which sociology 'calls the bluff of the constellations of self-justification and self-legitimation 
which the powerful use to further their own interests. But it is also, for students, a process 
whereby they break free for the first time of the opinions of teachers, parents and older people. 
Before, they were taught to respect and repeat the views of the guardians of the doxa. The social 
sciences calls on them now to formulate from the beginning their own views, to write essays in 
which they analyse and reflect. It is in this context that we need to see the response mentioned 
earlier, "Isn't sociology dangerous?". 
7. "I can now formulate my own opinions". 
8. "it made me think more critically and on many issues I never had an opinion but now I've 
developed an opinion for myself." 
9. "I never felt as if I had anything to do with Affirmative Action in fact I didn't even know 
anything about it." 
10. "I didn't really have any strong opinions, but this course showed me new concepts. and 
developed my understanding." 
11. "Sociology helps me to think for myself." 
Critical Thinking 
12. "Yes, I know not to believe everything I see and hear. "Question what you know" will 
always stay with me." 
13. "It challenged my 'shallow' and uninformed opinions and made me realize how little I 
really know and think about real issues. I feel my ways of thinking have matured. "; 
14. " ... it taught me to have a thorough knowledge on something before drawing conclusion"; 
15. "I don't take things at face value any more, more critical, try to look at situations from all 











16. " It gave me an informed view, I'm more interested now on where things come from and 
why." 
Challenges 
17. " ... challenging to our everyday thinking." 
18. "The theories in these sections defied stereotypes and provoked much thought." 
19. " ... it makes you think about things that you don't always want to think about." 
Absolute and Relative Truths - this category is one aspect of the broad process of relativizing, of 
de-absolutizing, whereby strongly loaded views lose their emotional power. Views infused with 
anger, disgust, fear come, in the final instance, to be recognized as parts of the self. What is 
unfamiliar becomes familiar, what is absolute and unique becomes relative and more ordinary. 
When a student says below, "I am now neutral about apartheid" I understand her/him to be saying 
"I do not consider this to be uniquely evil". The logical result of this emotional journey is empathy, 
where someone can put herself in the shoes of what was previously evil and disgusting. People 
become less judgmental and punitive. 
20. "I realized I had narrow perspectives on some topics." 
21. "I have a more open mind when it comes to issues such as affirmative action and crime." 
22. "I do not have absolute truths." 
23. " ... everything is not black and white. Things have grey areas too." 
24. "Yes, my mind changed concerning affirmative action from a negative to a positive 
mindset"; 
25. "I am now neutral about apartheid, AA and the role of criminals." 
Empathy 
26. "I changed my mind as to how I see people, and as to the influence of society on why 
people do what they do." 
27. " ... u realize that circumstance plays a huge role in people's lives." 
28. "I had not realized that a criminal can be anybody and that criminals need my support 
and care ... I now look at the homeless and other marginalized groups differently." 
29. "It made me empathize with (some) rapists and understand where deviant people are 
coming from"; 











31. "It was made apparent that there could be some justifications for why people commit 
crime, especially things like rape." 
What is of interest in this classification of responses is how well they fit into the concepts 
consciously pursued by the course: debunking, relativizing, system-relating. One might expect 
where lectures had pursued these ideas, given specific examples and exercises around them, 
that students would reflect these in a fairly explicit and literal way. They might use the same 
stories that a lecturer had told in class, repeat the same theoretical points. But what is happening 
here goes beyond that. In effect, the processes of debunking, relativizing and system-relating 
have happened in a much wider, substantive and un-conscious sense. Students have undergone 
changes without knowing it. More interestingly, sociology is doing what it claims to be doing. That 
would be a quite banal statement if courses did not so often fail to achieve what they manifestly 
aim to do. 
The course evaluations were followed by focus groups after the end of the course. They were 
intended to delve further into the meanings which lay behind the quite cryptic responses given in 
the course evaluations. There were four focus groups, three run by myself and the fourth run by 
my research assistant. There is a fifth face-to-face interview. 
Jennifer: "I suddenly realized, you know, what it was" 
In the first group, a white woman student (I will call her Jennifer) talks about her experience of 
affirmative action. She says that she comes from a relatively well-off family, has been to a private 
school, has a strong sense of religion, and has led quite a sheltered life. She had not met many 
blacks in her life before coming to university. In the focus group discussion, I have gone round the 
circle of the group. Other students have mentioned the parts of the course that struck them. It is 
now Jennifer's turn. 
She starts by saying that it was affirmative action in the course that struck her. It was a new 
concept for her. She explains that children "take on the opinions of their parents", "/'d never really 
thought it through myself'. Later on she elaborates, "at varsity you are given the chance to 
experience and explore your own point of view and substantiate to form your own opinion and 
you leam to stand up for it and urn it's a really good thing to be able to do that ". Now she has an 












Of course, she says, affirmative action can be threatening to people who might be disadvantaged 
by it, but it's different when you understand the reason behind it. "And naturally someone will be 
against a policy that is against you and then I realized its not so much against me but its for 
people who haven't had the opportunity before. And so I kind of got a chance to take on ... I got 
an understanding". 
Then Jennifer relates the event that shook her in quite a profound way. " ... with the assignment I 
interviewed a black girl in my res and it really hit home and I sat and cried after that. Because I 
suddenly realized, you know, what it was .. " She goes on to explain U ••• (the black girl) said, "The 
school that I went to I didn't receive education that was good enough for me to get good enough 
marks to get into university". And I thought, that's shocking, because I've had a privileged 
education, been to a private school, had really competent instructors in all my subjects. And I 
thought, this girl, its not her own fault that she didn't have ... like her parents couldn't afford to 
send her, like she went to a government school, where she just didn't receive like the same level 
of education that I did, and now she's doing Chemical Engineering and now she's in third year, 
and she's in the Golden Key Society. And I just thought, it's amazing that someone who started 
off so badly with such a poor kind of education could bring herself up to this level. "This black girl, 
says Jennifer, got into university through a quota. 
In this event Jennifer's stereotypes are confronted by a real living person. Her monster 
evaporates in the light of day. Her preconceptions crumble in the face of concrete experience. 
But, I would argue, this is a 'soft' stereotype. It is one which she inherited from her parents, and 
as such it has no particular emotional hold on her. Which is not to say that this is merely a 
cognitive, rational re-adjustment of her views. It has some energy for her, and she sits and cries. 
She goes through a significant change. She is pulled up short. It has just come upon her and 
found her present views inadequate. At the same time, this is not a case of a full move to 
empathy. She has not put herself in the shoes of her black neighbour. She says things like 'that's 
shocking', 'it's amazing' and 'it's not her fault'. Jennifer sympathizes rather than empathizes, she 
feels 'for' rather than 'with' her interviewee. 
There is something else that's curious in Jennifer's experience, and that is that she appears not 
to take into account the effect of apartheid on the life-chances of a black student. When she says 
'it's not her fault', or speaks of 'someone who started off so badly', she speaks of a lack rather 
than a deliberate discrimination and holding back. Here is a liberal approach that is shocked at 
inequality, but the answer to inequality is legal and social equality, not structural change in a 











The group has been discussing whether criminals are monsters. There have been a number of 
participants who say, no, criminals are not monsters. Jennifer intervenes in the conversation in a 
very strong way. "All criminals are monsters, there's no way that someone, in their dght mind, will 
commit a cdme. If you give them a chance to think through it, why - there's got to be some sort 
of mental imbalance jf someone has committed a cdme. If someone's been raped, someone's 
been murdered, someone's hi-jacked, there has got to be something in their mind that just isn't 
right, you know? They are normal people but they've got mental imbalances." People who rape, 
murder and hijack are monsters, they have a mental imbalance, their mind just isn't right. 
Here is the Other in a very powerful sense. This is a much more powerful and angry stereotype. It 
has a very different kind of energy from her views on affirmative action. And, despite her 
experience of the course, it has remained unmoved. What is the nature of the monster for 
Jennifer? Committing a crime is, for her, something inconceivable. There's only one way to 
explain it, and that is via 'mental imbalance'. But there is a contradiction for Jennifer. 'They are 
normal people but they have mental imbalances'. It is as if mental imbalance is something that 
gets added to normality to produce criminality. ~These others are like me, so why can't they act 
the way I do?". 
So, a weaker tolerant response on affirmative action, and a stronger angrier response on crime. 
How do these two different responses sit alongside each other? Is there a necessary uniformity 
across the parts of a personality? Or has Jennifer had a traumatic experience, been mugged or 
attacked, which anchors this anger? 
She goes to explain her view by calling on religious reasons. "And I think all of us are born with 
that sort of nature. Kind of the nature to have criminal tendencies, but it's about controlling it. You 
don't always have to (give in to it) ..... (it's) ridiculous how we can kind of actually(?) blame 
everything on how we were brought up. I am a Chdstian and I listened to a preacher .... . .. and 
she said you need to 're-parent' yourself. You can't rely on the way you have been brought up. " 
Here the earlier contradiction appears again, but in a different form. Here criminality is 
inconceivable. " ... all of us are born with that sort of naure .. but it's about controlling it". All 
people are capable of crime, but normal people are able to control these urges, they need to take 
responsibility for themselves and their behaviour. There is also a hint of empathy here. Or is this 
a rhetorical device to underline 'it's ridiculous how we can kind of actually blame everything on 











But then curiously she backs away from full-blown anger and from a call for punishment. The 
anger is tempered. "The Bible says, or God says, 'Vengeance is mine' and / think ultimately um 
death and life choices are not ours. You can do as much as you can with the human justice 
system. So you kind of punish, but I don't think you can decide death and we a/l have to pay for 
our acts." This fragment ends on the ambiguous note, 'we all have to pay for our acts'. It is not 
clear what she means here; that criminals must carry responsibility for their acts? Or that we, as 
judges, will pay if we kill criminals? 
In summary, then, a most curious mixture arising out of Jennifer's experience of the course: (1) 
the threat of affirmative action for her, and for all whites, is suspended by an intense experience 
which amazes by its situation of injustice; a sense of understanding and sympathy follows; she 
has gone through a changing experience - "/ suddenly realized, you know, what it was". This is 
close to the process of being pulled up short described by Kerdeman. It is not in a Freudian 
sense a meeting with the Other. She has not started out in terror or disgust and shifted to 
empathy. She has found herself discomfited, a secure world built on middle class religious 
foundations has been shaken. 
This is in strong contrast with her second reaction. Here there is (2) a strong statement of the 
Other - "there's no way that someone, in their right mind, will commit a crime", people must take 
responsibility for their own acts - again muted by conceding to a higher authority in judgment-
"God says 'Vengeance is mine". 
Nina: "Nazism - you'd never do that, but you would. It's unfortunate, but it's human 
nature." 
This is a white woman student with parents who are or have been both academics. She is in the 
same group as Jennifer, but differs quite sharply in her views on the nature of criminals and 
punishment. One suspects that she may have been pushed further in her views by her opposition 
to Jennifer. In her family, a number of the issues in the course have already been debated. She is 
clearly familiar with the arguments, and takes a consistently tolerant, sociological and intellectual 
(even cerebral) stand on these issues. In her case it is difficult to see any substantive change. 
What struck her most about the course? The salary paid to Michael Eisner, CEO of Disney. "And 
that really shocked me. It was something like $7,000 an hour. And then ... that staggered me .... 1 
mean, if he gave a few days' salary to some of the factories, the factory workers, it would make a 
big difference, I think that the inequality is a bit shocking. / mean, I was a/ways aware of it, but not 











radical approach. Nina is proposing a redistribution of wealth from owners to workers. This is a 
point of energy for Nina, she is busy constructing her own monster here. She is 'shocked', 
'staggered' - much more than when she talks (below) about criminals. It is a mixture of outrage at 
greed ("I can't imagine what anyone would do with that amount of money", she says), and at the 
gross injustice and inequality. 
Can one get finality on sociological issues? One student has been saying the inability to reach 
closure is frustrating. Nina disagrees. It ••• it also shows that there are lot of different possibilities, 
and so you have to do enough research to make sure that you have a firm viewpoint. Or enough 
research to convince yourself that you actually aren't confused." 
Are criminals monsters? Some students are saying, yes, they are. Nina strongly disagrees. She 
starts with the case of Hannibal Lecter (from the film, The Silence of the Lambs). Even for him 
there was an explanation of why he commiUed these crimes. "It was in some East European 
country during the Second World War, the soldiers were starving and they ate the children. And I 
think there is no unexplainable crime. . .. But I think there is always psychological damage 
involved. " At another point, one student argues that political leaders are monsters because they 
set the example for ordinary people to be corrupt. Nina says "I don't think you can call them 
monsters though, because it's human nature. Once one gets into power, they land up being 
corrupted. But I don't think that's because they are bad people . ... They are just greedy, but 
everyone is greedy. It's human nature." Further on she goes the whole way. Everybody has the 
capacity to be a monster. " ... I think it's very easy for people without a lot of money to say that 
other people are greedy and corrupt, but given those opportunities - it's the same with a lot of 
other things. People say they would never do it, Nazism - you'd never do that, but you WOUld. It's 
unfortunate, but it's human nature." Again a radicalism, this time in the form of a strong structural 
approach, Le. people are made what they are by society, they are shaped in ways that are 
beyond their control. 
What is the nature of criminality then, for Nina? She presents a less heated view than Jennifer's. 
There is 'psychological damage' involved, yes, but there is always a cause that one can trace 
back, everyone is tempted or corrupted by circumstance, 'it's human nature'. This is not a case of 
essential evil, mental imbalance (as in Jennifer's case) or depravity (as in Roland's). 
Does all of this mean that people should not be punished, that they do not carry responsibility for 
their deeds? No, says Nina, drawing on a philosophy course she did, and staying consistent with 
her principles "if you do something wrong, you are obviously capable of doing wrong and you 











do it again ... so it's not really so much punishment like torture or putting to death, but it's 
removing you from society ... ". Capital punishment is flawed because a great many innocent 
people have been put to death. The answer then, for some, is rehabilitation. 
Nina, then, comes to university from an academically oriented family. Many of the issues 
discussed in sociology are old hat. She has a sophisticated take on issues, and often sounds 
more like a senior student than a first year. Has she changed? There is very little evidence of this. 
Her family has pre-empted her academic work. More interestingly, has she really encountered the 
alien, when she says that everyone has the capacity to be a Nazi? Or is this an extension of what 
she has found in books? Has she felt the temptation of cruelty or corruption when she says "it's 
human nature"? Who does Nina pit herself against? Who is her Other? Possibly those who 
condemn others: ..... I think it's very easy for people without a lot of money to say that other 
people are greedy and corrupt, but given those opportunities ... ". She positions herself as the one 
who does not judge against those who make very easy judgements. 
Linda: "And the world just unravels in front of you" 
This is a face-to-face interview with an older (29 years old) 'Coloured' woman whom I will call 
Linda. She has been a community worker, an activist, an actress. Her family is strongly political. 
Her mother is also a community worker, mayoress of a town, a writer. She is much concerned 
about 'Coloured' identity. She is in one of my tutorial groups, but has not participated very 
actively. I introduce the topic, saying I want to pursue 'the bits that struck you', 'the kind of things 
that perked you up, got your eyebrows raised'. She responds enthUSiastically and with energy. 
She speaks about her community work, that it made her feel that she had no framework, no 
'intellectual basis'. She felt frustrated. I push her to elaborate on the words she uses. She 
responds, "I just found myself struggling more because I couldn't put my finger on what it was that 
I needed to focus on - and coming to the university and doing sociology, archeology, 
anthropology and drama put it all into perspective"; " ... I felt like I couldn't go any further, 
intellectually I couldn't go further because I didn't ... and I was grasping at straws, I would read 
books and I couldn't put them into context with anything because I didn't have a grounding, and 
then I realized that I need to come to university"; " ... I couldn't argue, I couldn't debate, I couldn't 
write ... When I wrote a report, I struggled, because I COUldn't substantiate .. ". 
Coming to university made a significant difference. It did many of the things she wanted it to. And 
things start to change for her, connections are made, things fit into broader historical and 











which you can apply every day in your life. You open newspapers. You read articles. I mean the 
articles may not say that this is Weber or whatever, but if you know the thing you can apply it, and 
the world just unravels in front of YOU"; " ... I am excited about learning ... and I don't get 
depressed any more because I am realizing that if you educate yourself you can make the 
difference ... You can change it as you go along". 
Here is an experience of empowerment for Linda. Things that were confusing and random start 
falling into place. They make sense in a theoretical perspective. This is a strong experience of 
system-relating and of coherence. But more than that, she sees the implications for action which 
seemed to be blocked before. "You can change it as you go along". 
On development g Just seeing the knock-on effect of negative development was amazing for me, 
because it also put into perspective, it put into perspective the stuff that I had read in the last few 
years on slave society ... ,;. "history is another angle on this matter of perspective: " ... because I 
am so passionate about what is happening in the townships and personally I needed to 
understand what has happened in the past that made me see the things that are happening now, 
and that aspect of (the textbook) Poverty and Development put it into perspective for me. You 
know, this ball starting rolling four or five hundred years ago. " 
Linda is driven by apartheid as the Other, as the evil one. This is what she is 'passionate' about. 
She has in this fragment seen through the essence of evil, seen that it has a historical root, that it 
can be grappled with. This is the sense of empowerment which flows from system-relating. 
Being at university gave her a lot of confidence. She tells this story, "I put up my hand (in one of 
the lectures) and said "Um, I'm sorry, I don't like the use of the word, coloured, in class': and he 
was like "But, but, but, you know, we use it all the time", And I said, "Then, no, you should change 
it, this is the place where you change words. A university changes words. " And then afterwards 
he was so scared. Every time he used the word, coloured, then he searched me out. (Laughter) 
$0 this is what university has done for me. It's made me put up my hand and say "Listen" and you 
don't have to be aggressive about it."; And then again later, "Ja, (university) gave me confidence 
Here is the fruit of the confidence that academic authority gives to Linda, here is the 
substantiation that she was looking for. She is able to challenge a senior academic in a public 
arena, ironically challenging the source of her own confidence. Academia gives here 'voice' is a 











Sociological theory was one of the things that struck home: "I was passionate, I was obsessed 
about that. The first thing I would do when I came home was just read - everything, sociology text 
books ... " 
She finds a different identity, particularly coloured identity, at university. she moves away from the 
values of the acting world, and embraces those of community work and political activism:" ... I 
went into acting. I discovered that actors are very selfish, self-absorbed"; "I literally rebelled, 
drank, went clubbing ... And then I think coming to university was the culmination of me finding 
my space in Cape Town .. ". In her community she has a programme teaching children about their 
cultural history and origins. 'They need to understand why they lack pride. And in understanding 
why they lack pride, it just covers the historical aspects of it, the psychological aspects of it, the 
geographical aspect of it, because our forefathers didn't come from here - they were brought 
here ... " 
In teaching children, Linda is teaching herself. She is showing them and herself the opportunities 
for action against racial prejudice and discrimination. The world of acting was, in a sense, an 
expression of melancholy and self-negation, a cui de sac. Political action gives her direction, 
optimism and the capacity to act on the world, to penetrate the Other which is apartheid. It gives 
her through theoretical diagnosis. the power to treat the disease. She has found a way to battle 
the Other. This is close to Fanon's notion of a fighting culture. She experiences the same 
enlivenment and cathartic engagement as the Algerian peasants did. At the same time, battling 
the Other is something quite different from meeting the Other. This second task is far and away 
the more challenging one. 
At university she comes across students who do not share her 'enlightened' and theorized views. 
By sketching her differences with them, she further delineates her own opinions. "But it frustrated 
me that nobody else had shared this enthusiasm .. "; "And 1'/1 come home and call my mom, and 
say 'What the hell are the students doing at VCT? They are wasting my time." She tells the story 
of meeting a third year woman student in the cafetaria who criticizes her for 'wasting your time 
reading the newspaper'. "I don't know if f was disgusted or shocked, I mean, your third year!". 
Linda here finds a new Other in her academic discourse. She finds herself somewhere between 
disgust and shock. For her, political apathy is very close to racial oppression. 
In brief, coming to university (from acting) for Linda means the movement from pessimistic stasis 











Other, which, I argue, is very different and not quite as difficult as meeting the Other. This is a 
very particular and striking case of empowerment. 
Karen - "I knew that at some point I was buying into the stereotype" 
Karen presents herself as quite enlightened in a racial sense, free of racial stereotypes. (She 
uses the word, stereotype, quite a lot.) Her mother had a job which involved purposeful 
affirmative action for ex-political prisoners. She is in the same focus group as Roland, the 
following interview, in which issues of rape, and gangs are very prominent. As a resident of 
Johannesburg, she sees herself as quite knowledgeable about crime. What are the issues which 
make an impact on her? 
First, the section in the course on crime and deviance: she used to think that rape is 'something 
that the black person does to the white person' but she now sees that this is a product of 'racist 
ideologies'. "/ think for me it did quite shock me. I think it's because I always pride myself on 
being someone who does not believe in stereotypical things ... / a/ways pride myself on that fact 
that I a/ways look deeper", but she finds that in fact she was subscribing to precisely these 
stereotypes. "And so I think it did really kind of shock me and I was like 'Well, that's something 
that I actually bought into once in a while'. You do kind of buy into it." 
Karen is pulled up short here. She suddenly sees herself in an unflattering light. Her image of 
herself which she used to 'pride myself in' is deflated. She is caught unawares by contradictory 
evidence and she needs to rethink, 'it did really kind of shock me'. 
Karen is also pulled up short by the notion of rape between men in prison. "Why would guys want 
to do that in prison? I mean, that's so not a male thing to do." And the explanation for this 
behaviour is that "rape in prisons is about power, and about authority. . rape is not a sexual act." 
It's about 'overcoming' and 'overpowering' the other person. I think a lot of people think it's 
homosexual and it's so not." The phrase 'a lot of people' suggests a view that she herself used to 
hold. 
This is a different response now to the issue of rape among men. Curiously, this has similarities 
to Roland's (the next interviewee) response. She is disturbed by homosexuality among men, 
rather than by the violence of it, but takes refuge in the notion that 'rape is not a sexual act'. Like 
Roland the anxiety is not resolved but avoided. She can change her attitude by reframing this 











This change brings her into conflict with older people she meets. They participate in these racial 
stereotypes, they say things like "Oh, it's so typical", but cannot tolerate opposing views. 
On gangs in South Africa, " ... everybody thinks that drug-related gangs are Nigerian, they're not. 
A lot of drug-related gangs are normal white South African .. ". She catches herself, "Well, not 
normal ... but white South African individuals". 
On UCT campus she differentiates herself from a range of 'people who had just come straight out 
of matric', who still buy into stereotypes, who come from very sheltered lives, who haven't really 
been taught to think, or are offended by critique of Disney. "You are not brought up to challenge 
your stereotypes." The course has "made me actually sit and think about it in a different way .. for 
me it's no longer become a situation of just hearing about the stereotypes. It's become about 
finding the solutions to it and really understanding what the situation involves". Here too she 
overlaps with Roland. She differentiates herself from other students who haven't really been 
taught to think. She does not ridicule them like Roland does, but 'they' are people who 'buy into 
stereotypes' . 
Has Karen changed? Has she been surprised? Yes, she says. Thinking herself racially tolerant 
and enlightened, she is shocked to find that she has indeed been prejudiced. On racial issues 
she sees that she has 'bought into' the stereotypes. On crime she is surprised by the incidence of 
rape between male prisoners, not as a sexual act, but one of power. This is not a major crisis of 
identity. She has not been reduced to tears. Nor has she been caught in emotions of disgust or 
anger. But she does know that her views have shifted. She has suffered deflation of her image of 
herself. This she bolsters by contrasting herself with older people, with unspecified 'a lot of 
people' and with those other students on campus 'who haven't been taught to think'. 
Roland: ..... it's always disgusted me ... .I've always condemned such things" 
Roland is a young white student from the suburb of Pinelands. He presents himself as leading 
quite a sheltered life, particularly at preparatory school. The population at his high school in more 
raCially mixed, but nothing out of the ordinary. He sees now that things might have been 
deceptively simple. He is caught up in a conversation where rape and gangs feature prominently. 
Karen, in the previous interview, is to some extent his counterpoint. 
On the issue of rape among men in prison, Roland starts his explanation in a curiously 
contradictory fashion. He's ~ thought about something which has always disgusted him. "It's 











condemned such things. II But he is surprised that rape is not a matter of depravity, it's not out of 
the ordinary. On the contrary, it's expected, it's institutionalized, "it's actually very ordinary". 
Roland starts with a strong emotional response, 'it's always disgusted me', but the energy-bubble 
of disgust is popped by the thought that it's not about 'depravity', 'it's actually very ordinary'. 
Roland's monster-image comes up against a perfectly ordinary explanation. It is not necessary to 
be disgusted. This is not a case of individualized pathology. It is part of a bigger pattern. 'It's 
institutionalized'. A similar move happens in the next fragment. 
He is also caught by the notion (from lectures) that a woman might rape a man, or a woman. "It 
takes the idea of rape out of a sexual context." In this example I presented to students in a lecture 
the possibility that rape flows from damaged male identity. By this logic women (with damaged 
female identity) might also 'rape' by taking out their frustration on children. Here again the 
frightening part of rape is removed. 'It takes it out of sexual context.' Is there something about 
male homosexuality that frightens Roland? He has come up against the Other but found a way to 
avoid it. 
On gangs, he was unaware of this arena of activity, but then suddenly discovers it right under his 
nose. "And that's why I found it really interesting, cuz it's like "Wow, something totally different". 
But it's on my back door and I don't know anything about it." " ... I realized what some of the guys 
in my school were talking about when they were acting a certain way ... They were trying to 
emulate the gangs, or maybe they were in the gangs" . .. So, you know, it suddenly brings to light 
what's going on." 
He also comes across (science) students who are not interested in 'big issues', in philosophical 
questions. They protest to him, "That has no impact on my life. That's just up in the air, silly stuff. 
Give me concrete stuff." He is critical of their lack of interest. Again, like Linda, he defines his 
own position by contrast with people that he disagrees with. And like Linda there is a budding 
identity and a budding prejudice here. Roland defines himself over an against science students. 
He treats them with some condescension, holds them up for ridicule and laughter among the 
other members of the group. 
In short, two interesting things happen to Roland. His strong disgust-reaction to rape among men 
in prison (a powerful Other) turns out to be unnecessary. 'It's not a matter of depravity.' The 
monster is actually quite ordinary. He is also caught by the lecturer's example taking rape out of a 











the emotional load of his response. He will, one suspects, be less severe, less punitive, less 
angry - although it is not clear to what extent. 
On the other hand. something that was very ordinary in his previous school experience has 
turned out to be interesting and unusual. What he thought was mere schoolboy banter turns out 
to have been gang language. A connection has been made into the broader society which he was 











Chapter 5: Conclusion - Transformations And Instruments 
This dissertation started by addressing two issues. The first concerned the nature of the shifts in 
the perceptions and identities of students in a first year sociology course. Here I pursued a 
number of detailed aspects: points of energy, the discursive framework, forms of transformation 
and metaphors for the Other. The second issue concerned the experiences associated with 
achieving these transformations. What have we learned about these two issues through the use 
of Gadamer's hermeneutics, through an excavation of a word like 'eye-opener'? 
Let us consider the nature of transformation, or in Gadamerian terms, meeting the alien, being 
pulled up short, returning life to its original difficulty, perplexity. Here there are a number of points 
to be made. 
First, it has been important for my analysis of interviews to go beyond Gadamer and Kerdeman 
and to distinguish meeting the alien from meeting the Other. Meeting the alien is Kerdeman's 
notion of being pulled up short, illustrated by Gadamer's use of the biblical story of the prodigal 
son. In Jungian terms it is a process of puncturing hubris and inflation, grandiosity, pretensions to 
omnipotence. It is the story of Icarus flying too high. And we have seen strong examples of this in 
the interviews with Jennifer (in her shift concerning affirmative action), Katherine (in her shift with 
regard to Muslim female circumcision), and Karen (in her realization that she had been 'buying 
into' racial stereotypes). 
Meeting the Other, by contrast, as spelled out by Stuart Hall, is the reclamation of a projection. 
This projection occurs when secret fears or forbidden desires are externalized on to another 
person or thing. Responses to the Other are emotionally charged and present in both negative 
and positive forms. Symptoms of the Other might then be disgust, anger, terror, outrage or, on 
the other hand, admiration, worship, desire. Re-integration of the Other occurs when the 
individual recognizes the attributes of the Other as intra-psychic and acknowledges the 
mechanism of projection. In many ways this is a more dramatic and rarer change. 
There are in the interviews many examples of the presence of the Other, the experience of the 
energy of the Other. But re-integrating the Other is quite rare and more difficult. In the interviews, 
Roland comes close to this meeting in re-orienting himself with regard to prison rape, which he 
had always found 'disgusting' but then realized it was not really a case of 'depravity'. Karen does 
something very similar in her reframing of rape as a power-issue rather than one of sex. There 
are tantalizing signs in the course evaluations where one student says "It made me empathize 











not realized that a criminal can be anybody and that criminals need my support and care". It is 
difficult to say from these latter two fragments how dramatic the change was. But in the end, I do 
not think any of the interviews show a full re-integration of a projection. 
So, meeting the alien, experiencing the energy of the Other, and meeting or re-integrating the 
Other - there were, in addition, two more ways in which participants engaged with the Other. In 
Fanonian terms, Linda struggled against the Other, or put more precisely, she moved from a 
position of depressive stasis to one of highly energized political activism in which she was 
mobilizing 'Coloured' culture to fight the after-effects of apartheid. This is very close to Fanon's 
narrative of an oppressed peasant culture, les damnes de la terre, which is consumed by self-
hate, intracommunal violence and fantastical fears. Through political mobilization there is a 
transformation to creative and healing optimism (Fanon, 1968). 
Finally, there is the case of catharsis through the unburdening of emotional baggage, a 
therapeutic anamnesis, a revealing of long-hidden Others from behind curtains of shame and guilt 
(Edinger, 1972). This would appear to be what happened to Katherine "suddenly going back to 
childhood memories I didn't want to go to", but given the available evidence it is not clear. 
What were the metaphors used to represent the various Others? In what form, clothed in which 
garb, did Others appear, in their double identity of threat and dangerous attraction? And what 
does this say about personal identity? For Jennifer, violent criminals suffered from a 'mental 
imbalance'. They are effectively insane, not the same as 'we' are, beyond the pale of 
understanding. For Roland, rape among prison inmates is a case of 'depravity', hints of sexual 
boundlessness and orgy, which he finds disgusting. For Nina, there is the greed of the corporate 
executive, Michael Eisner, who gets paid an obscenely large salary. And this is quite close to 
Katherine's outrage at the injustice of the endorsements paid to Michael Jordan. Both of them are 
struck by the lop-sided comparison with workers' salaries. For Nina, too, there is the interesting 
Other of people who are too easily judgmental. " ... I think it's very easy for people without a lot of 
money to say that other people are greedy and corrupt, but given those opportunities ... ". Nina 
presents herself as the person who does not judge. 
Then we have a number of interviewees who come up against Others in the form of their parents 
and erstwhile school teachers, and also on campus, amongst other students: science students 
who dislike "up in the air, silly stuff' (Roland), commerce lecturers who require effectively nothing 
more than lists in their assignments (Roland), career-stricken students who are excessively 
"materialistic" (in the 1980's there were riot-police on campus) (Katherine), students who want to 











to read newspapers, and are politically unmotivated (Linda), and students who" are prepared to 
just take what the lecturer says" for exam purposes (Nina) . The 'new' social student then 
presents herself as politically aware, able to be critical of the university and its lecturers, and 
moved by ideas and morality. 
How do these transformations relate to academic skills? Cognitive skills and approaches pursued 
in the sociological imagination have often hidden emotional parallels that go with them. There is 
an Aladdin's cave of riches waiting to be discovered there. Put differently, learning new ways of 
argument are also frequently new ways of self-understanding. What is an 'eye-opener' is also 
often an 'I-opener'. When students say that 'this course was an eye-opener', they are saying 
much more than that they simply came to new inSights. While we can and do measure cognitive 
skills through the setting of assignments and exams, emotional aspects can be accessed through 
qualitative instruments of research like course evaluations, interviews and focus group 
discussions. Thus, aspects of the SOCiological imagination like relativizing and de-absolutizing 
correspond directly with the psychological/philosophical principles of meeting the alien and 
meeting the Other. These aspects have further parallels in religion. 
Third, meeting the alien and meeting the Other are partial, fragmentary, contradictory and 
situationally bound processes. What happens in one part of an individual psyche or personality or 
in one situation does not necessarily generalize through to other parts or to other situations. 
Jennifer's meeting the alien in the area of affirmative action did not have equivalent ripples 
through into meeting the Other in the area of crime. 
Fourth, re-integrating the alien or the Other in one discourse does not stop the creation of new 
aliens and Others in another discourse. The position of becoming a social science student, for 
example, throws up new Others. These new Others are presented as uninformed, politically 
quiescent, morally passive, materialistic, instrumentally driven and so on. 
Let us turn to the second question asked above. What are the mechanisms which have been 
effective in bringing about these transformations? Or, to put this more precisely, which aspects of 
a sociology first year course do students report to have made an impact on them? 
At a first level, and inasmuch as these are questions of general causation, they are almost 
impossible to answer. What becomes apparent from the interviews and the focus group 
discussions is that student responses vary hugely, both in their particular aspects, but more 
especially in their combinations of reactions. As soon as a researcher starts to dig a little into the 











Looking at the six case-studies which I have summarized and condensed, each displays a 
particularity which overlaps very little with the others. And this variety, I would expect, would 
unravel further and further as one delves deeper. 
This unpredictability has interesting implications for how one thinks about student 'voice', and 
lecturers' power over students. For, in hermeneutic terms, the meeting of horizons (between what 
students know and what they come up against) is always a creative act. there is always 
interpretation involved. In Stuart Hall's terms, every reader of an encoded text, decodes and re-
encodes it in a very particular way (Hall, 1973). Discourse analysts might say that the range of 
varieties of re-encoding is limited by the repertoire of available discourses. But who is to say how 
wide that repertoire might be? In the end, active interpretation is an ontological condition of 
existence. Interpreters cannot escape having their own voice. 
At a second level. it does seem as if students did respond to the broad debunking. relativizing 
and system-relating currents in the SOCiological imagination. I have shown above how, for 
example, system-relating shows itself in (new) experiences for students of social embeddedness 
and seeing new explanations (see p.37 above). I have shown also how debunking breaks down 
into independent thinking, critical thinking and challenges to everyday thinking in stUdent 
experience; and finally how relativizing connects into the move away from absolute truth, and the 
move towards empathy for them. What the precise paints of connection are is more difficult to pin 
down. I have discussed some examples used in lectures and in the course reading of each of the 
above principles. Now and again in course evaluations and in the interviews it is possible to make 
concrete connections. Nina, for example, says that she was shocked at Michael Eisner's salary, 
and Katherine at Michael Jordan's endorsements, both cases from the readings. Jennifer, for her 
part, on her own initiative, interviewed a black woman student. She constructed her own 
experience. In the final course evaluation a large proportion of students in the class mentioned 
Crime and Deviance as the section of the course which made an impact - but which part, which 
examples, theories, arguments? I do not think it is possible to show causal connections here. 
In the end, this result should not be surprising. A qualitative and ethnographic approach is not 
designed to tap into matters of cause and effect, to compare pre- and post-test benchmarks. 
What we have are fruitful impressions and suggestive connections mixed in with a multitude of 
situational and individual particularities. And in pedagogy maybe this is sufficient. Experienced 
lecturers experiment with new approaches, and new strategies. Some of these experiments 
'work' in the sense that students 'respond positively' i.e. when they come to fill in course 
evaluation questionnaires after 12 weeks of the course they have good or perhaps just interesting 











sense of what are generative approaches, and what are not. but the exact connections remain 
something of a black box. Ethnographic studies of the kind performed in this dissertation add 
considerable colour and richness to the black box, sharpen sensitivities and empathies, tune the 
ear to finer listening. That is what the generative question of the title of this dissertation means. 
Clifford Geertz says 
The essential vocation of interpretive anthropology is not to answer our deepest 
questions, but to make available to us answers that others, guarding other sheep in other 
valleys, have given, and thus to include them in the consultable record of what man has 
said (Geertz, 1973:30). 
And these are advantages not to be sneezed at. This is what hermeneutics is. 
Does this study then have implications for teaching despite the disclaimers and complexities that I 
have mentioned above? There are two main things to say here. The first is that the affective 
background to teaching and learning that I have been investigating here is very dependent on 
students' opportunities for engaging on a personal level with the curriculum. Making that personal 
connection takes a great deal of thought, particularly when the 'connection' involves 500 
individuals. And it takes careful attention to continuing communication. Such communication 
happened in this first year course in a number of different places: in small tutorial groups where 
tutors could pay more detailed attention; from a mid-term course evaluation which had suggestive 
comments; from brief response notes collected during lectures testing student opinion; tapping 
into student reaction to assignments and exercises, and using some of these responses to 
formulate assignment topics which spoke to immediate enthusiasms and energies. 
The second implication of this research, to repeat a point made earlier, is that it is a fundamental 
critique of Outcomes-Based Education and OBE's commitment to pre-planned results which can 
be specified at the beginning of a course in statements like "At the end of this course students will 
be able to '" ". One of the main conclusions of this study has been to underline the 
unpredictability of outcomes. 
Does that mean that teaching cannot be assessed, that teaching becomes a quasi-mystical 
activity which is beyond analysis and judgment? I do not think so. Just as there are still criteria for 
validating qualitative research after positivism, so too are there criteria for assessing teaching 
which commits itself to hermeneutic standards. So, for example, good teachers must have 'thick 
knowledge' of their students, their practice must be generative of new ideas and of self-











There are also the standards set by the notion of phronesis, for example, that good teaching 
should be a process of sensitive communication with students (continuous assessment being one 
form), and curriculum content should connect with the personal concerns of students. All of these 
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